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Since the initial disclosure of accounting irregularities at Enron in late 2001, the 
landscape of public company audits has undergone substantial change.  These changes 
include the conviction of Arthur Andersen in June of 2002 and the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  These two changes have had a significant impact on the 
amount of work required to issue an audit report and the number of clients that can be 
serviced by the remaining Big Four audit firms.  While the existing literature provides us 
some insight on how audit firms make client acceptance/continuance decisions, almost all 
this literature predates SOX.  I extend this literature by investigating how audit firms 
make client continuance decisions in the post-SOX era, whether these decisions are 
effective at identifying better clients, and why audit firms retain some risky clients while 
dismissing others.  It is interesting to note that Big Four audit firms use the same basic set 
of criteria when making a client continuance decision in the post-SOX era, even though 
the processes at the firms are slightly different.  My findings also indicate that the client 
continuance process is much more formal and rigorous post-SOX.  Additionally, I find 
that clients who are retained by their audit firms have better subsequent financial 
performance than those clients who are not retained.  Finally, I find that audit firms 
appear to overweight client size when making the client continuance decision.  
Specifically, it appears audit firms retain large clients who have risk profiles consistent 
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 Since the initial disclosure of accounting irregularities at Enron in late 2001, the 
landscape of public company audits has undergone substantial change.  These changes 
include the conviction of Arthur Andersen (Andersen) in June of 2002 and the enactment 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX).  These two changes have had a significant 
impact on the amount of work required to issue an audit report and the number of clients 
that can be serviced by the remaining Big Four audit firms. 
The first change came in June of 2002 when Andersen was convicted of 
obstruction of justice for shredding documents relating to its work for Enron.1  This 
conviction meant that Andersen would have to discontinue the audit of all public 
companies on August 31, 2002 and over 1,000 public companies would be looking for a 
new auditor (GAO, 2003; Barton, 2005).  In addition to changes spurred by the demise of 
Andersen, SOX required external auditors to document, test, and issue a report on the 
internal controls of each of their public clients.2  This requirement alone substantially 
increased the number of audit hours for each public company and put substantial strain on 
the audit firms’ resources.   
In testimony before the Senate Banking Committee in September 2004, James 
Turley, the CEO of Ernst & Young, indicated that “The Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s 
requirements and pressures put a great strain on our ability to retain sufficient personnel” 
(Turley, 2004).  Additionally, according to an Inc. Magazine report, 
                                                 
1 The conviction of Andersen for obstruction of justice was overturned by the Supreme Court on May 31, 
2005. 
2 Currently, the internal control requirements of SOX only relate to companies with a public float of greater 
than $75 million.  Companies with a public float of less than $75 million will not have to comply with the 




PricewaterhouseCoopers had to import 1,000 auditors from abroad in 2005 to help with 
the strain on its personnel (Gunderson, 2005).  In apparent response to the influx of 
former Andersen clients, the additional audit requirements of SOX and the strain these 
requirements have put on audit personnel, audit firms have reacted by resigning from 
over 1,000 clients in the three year period post-SOX as compared to only 250 clients in 
the two year period pre-SOX and by dramatically increasing their audit fees (Ettredge et 
al., 2005).3   
Based on recent news releases, it appears the SEC is very concerned about the 
dramatic increase in the number of auditor changes in the post-SOX era.  In an interview, 
former SEC Chief Accountant Donald Nicolaisen said the SOX requirements “should not 
be a convenient tool for them [Big Four auditing firms] to manage their business.  They 
do have a responsibility in the public trust.”  He went on to indicate that “I’ve expressed 
my view to the CEOs of the big firms that I think it is their responsibility not to run away 
from the marketplace” (Taub, 2004).   
In combination, the demise of Andersen and the additional audit requirements of 
SOX have ushered in a period of unprecedented auditor changes.  Given the concerns of 
the SEC and the large number of audit clients affected by these auditor changes, it is 
important to understand why audit firms are not retaining clients in the post-SOX era.  
While the previous literature on auditor acceptance/continuance provides some insight as 
to the firm factors/characteristics associated with resignations and how audit firms make 
client acceptance/continuance decisions, almost all of this literature predates SOX.  I 
                                                 
3 Auditor resignation data comes from Audit Analytics.  Audit Analytics reports all auditor changes post 




extend this literature by investigating how audit firms make client continuance decisions 
in the post-SOX era, whether these decisions are effective at retaining better clients, and 
why audit firms retain some risky clients while dismissing others.   
Specifically, in the first part of my analysis I interview audit partners to 
understand how audit firms make client continuance decisions in the post-SOX 
environment.  It is interesting to note that Big Four audit firms use the same basic set of 
criteria when making a client continuance decision, even though the processes at the 
firms are slightly different.  Based on my interviews, it appears the client continuance 
process has become more formal and rigorous post-SOX.  Specifically, the partners cited 
an increase in the required documentation and the level of internal review as the key 
drivers of this change.  They also indicated that management’s integrity and attitude 
toward financial reporting were two of the key determinants of client continuance.  In 
addition, the partners also cited several financial and governance characteristics that were 
important to the client continuance decision.  Finally, they identified the quality of a 
company’s internal controls, the audit committee, and the strain a client has on audit staff 
as the factors that had received increased importance in the post-SOX environment.       
In addition to gaining an understanding of the client continuance process, I also 
examine the effectiveness of the client continuance decision.  My findings indicate that 
audit firms retain better clients.  Specifically, I find that clients who are retained by their 
audit firm subsequently have better subsequent financial performance than those clients 
who are not retained.  In contrast, in my final analysis, I find that audit firms appear to 
overweight client size when making the client continuance decision for “risky” clients.  




with smaller clients they dismiss.  This result seems in sharp contrast to the interviews 
where the partners indicated that the goal of the client continuance process was to 
eliminate undue risk.  Several partners went so far as to say that no audit fee was 
sufficient to cover the litigation costs of retaining a risky client. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  The next section discusses 
the regulatory background and previous research on the audit market structure, audit 
quality, and auditor resignation/continuance.  I then examine the client retention process 
in the post-SOX environment.  Subsequent sections examine whether audit firms are 
retaining better clients and why audit firms retain some risky clients while dismissing 
others.  The last section concludes.   
Regulatory Background and Previous Research 
Audit Market Structure 
Accounting and auditing evolved as part of the corporate governance system 
developed to combat the agency problem that exists between managers and owners.  
Auditors not only provide assurance that financial statements are fairly presented, but 
also provide implicit insurance on the quality of the financial statements (Menon and 
Williams, 1994).  Starting with the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933 all publicly-held 
corporations were required to have their financial statements certified by independent 
outside auditors.  This early period of the auditing profession was characterized by little 
competition among the audit firms.  However, in a 1977 U.S. Supreme Court ruling, the 
ban on advertising by professional service firms was overturned.  This ruling ushered in a 




Companies were free to solicit new bids from audit firms, year after year, to get a 
better price from their auditors.  In this new environment, profit margins for audit 
services disappeared leaving audit partners to focus on providing more lucrative non-
audit services to their clients.  This decision to focus on non-audit services led to a new 
set of concerns about auditor independence (Sunder, 2003).  These concerns continued to 
escalate until they reached a crisis state with the high profile failures of Enron and 
WorldCom.  In association with the Enron failure, Andersen was convicted of obstruction 
of justice for shredding documents.  This conviction prevented Andersen from 
performing audits for publicly traded companies and effectively dissolved the firm, 
leaving only four major participants in the audit market.  In combination, the high profile 
failures of Enron and WorldCom and the demise of Andersen ushered in a period of 
regulatory reform for the accounting and auditing industries. 
Sarbanes Oxley Act 
In July of 2002, Congress and President Bush enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX), in response to what at the time appeared to be a never-ending list of corporate 
scandals.  President Bush called SOX “the most far-reaching reforms of American 
business practice since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.”  The preamble of SOX 
indicates its purpose is “to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of 
corporate disclosures made pursuant to securities laws, and for other purposes” (Hamilton 
and Trautmann, 2002).  A major emphasis of SOX relates to increasing investor 
confidence in companies’ financial reporting quality via additional disclosures.  SOX 




companies to disclose if they have a financial expert on their audit committee, requiring 
companies to obtain an opinion on the assessment of internal control environment, 
requiring CEO and CFO certification of financial statements with the possibility of 
criminal penalties for failure to comply with SOX, prohibiting audit firms from 
performing some non-audit services for audit clients, mandatory audit partner rotation 
every five years, and the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) (SOX, 2002).   
In March of 2004 the PCAOB issued Auditing Standard No. 2 – An Audit of 
Internal Control Over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction with An Audit of 
Financial Statements, which proscribes the standards a public accounting firm must 
follow to issue the attestation report required by Section 404 of SOX.  Under this 
standard, the public accounting firm must issue two opinions related to the audit of 
internal control over financial reporting: one on management's assessment and one on the 
effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting (PCAOB, 2004). 
Auditor Resignation/Continuance 
The prior research on auditor resignations has generally taken one of three 
approaches: modeling the market for audit services and the change decision (e.g. Johnson 
and Lys, 1990; Bockus and Gigler, 1998; Schloetzer, 2005), examination of the stock 
market reaction to the resignation (e.g. Wells and Loudder, 1997; DeFond et al., 1997; 
Dunn et al. 1999; Shu, 2000; Whisenant et al, 2003; Beneish et al. 2005), and 
examination of auditor and/or client characteristics that are associated with the auditor 




Rama, 1999; Shu 2000; Lee et al. 2004; Johnstone and Bedard, 2004; Schloetzer, 2005).4  
My approach most closely resembles the last of these three approaches.   
 Under the first approach, authors analytically model the market for audit services 
and the auditor change decision.  Johnson and Lys (1990) argue that audit clients 
purchase audit services from the least cost supplier and that auditor realignment can be 
attributed to changes in client characteristics and differences in the audit firm cost 
structures.  Building on the work of Johnson and Lys (1991), as well as others who model 
the auditor change decision (e.g. Fried and Schiff, 1981; Nichols and Smith, 1983; 
Menon and Schwartz, 1985; Healy and Lys, 1986; Francis and Wilson, 1988; DeFond, 
1992), Bockus and Gigler (1998) model a theory of auditor resignation.  Their model 
predicts that auditors resign from engagements when the incumbent auditor assesses a 
client as having a sufficiently high litigation risk.  The model goes on to show that the 
incumbent auditor resigns, as opposed to risk-adjusting their audit fee, because a risk-
adjusted audit fee would only be accepted by “bad” clients.  Finally, Schloetzer (2005) 
models the response of the audit services market to the demise of Andersen and the 
additional audit requirements of SOX.  His model predicts that the number of audits 
completed by the remaining Big Four will decrease and audit fees will increase after each 
event.   
 Another group of studies examines the stock market reaction to the resignation 
decision.  In general, these studies have found a negative stock market reaction to an 
auditor resignation (Wells and Loudder, 1997; DeFond et al, 1997; Dunn et al. 1999; Shu, 
                                                 
4 Prior to issuance of FRR No. 31, companies were not required to disclose whether auditor changes were 
the result of a resignation or a dismissal.  Thus, most of the studies prior to 1988 examine auditor changes 




2000; Whisenant et al, 2003; Beneish et al., 2005). In addition, Beneish et al. (2005) go 
one step further and examine the stock market reaction to continuing clients when an 
auditor resigns from another client.  Their results show a positive reaction for continuing 
clients when the resignation is disclosed in the media. 
 Finally, the last group of studies examines the auditor and/or client characteristics 
that are associated with the auditor resignation/continuance decision.   These studies 
indicate that auditor resignation is associated with client-auditor disagreements (Krishnan 
and Krishnan, 1997; Lee et al., 2004), discretionary accruals (DeFond and Subramanyam, 
1998), financial distress (Krishnan and Krishnan, 1997; Schwartz and Soo, 1995), 
issuance of a going concern opinion (Krishnan and Krishnan, 1997; Lee et al., 2004) 
internal control deficiencies (Lee et al., 2004; Hertz, 2005; Ettredge et al. 2005), lower 
audit fees (Ettredge et al., 2005), litigation risk (Krishnan and Krishnan, 1997; Shu, 2000; 
Lee et al., 2004), client mismatch (Shu, 2000), board and audit committee independence 
(Lee et al., 2004), reporting lags (Schwartz and Soo, 1996; Schloetzer, 2005), reportable 
events (Whisenant et al., 2003) and smaller clients (Lee et al., 2004).   
Additionally, another set of studies examine the client continuance decision.  
Huss and Jacobs (1991) review the client acceptance/continuance policies of the Big Six 
accounting firms.  They note that the overall risk containment and client 
acceptance/continuance procedures differ substantially across the Big Six.  In addition, 
Bell et al. (2002) examine the use of a computerized client acceptance/continuance 
decision aid by KPMG LLP.  In this study, the authors discuss the intricacies of 
implementing a computerized decision aid as part of auditor business risk assessment.  




information to those charged with practice-wide risk management and audit quality 
control responsibilities.  Finally, Johnstone and Bedard (2004) examine the portfolio 
management process of one of the large auditing firms.  Consistent with risk avoidance, 
the authors note that the audit firm is shedding riskier clients and that audit risk factors 
are more important in portfolio management decisions than are financial risk factors.   
Audit Quality 
Starting with DeAngelo (1981), previous accounting literature has found some 
indications of audit quality differences between the Big N and the non-Big N.5  
Specifically, previous literature has noted Big N audit firms are associated with higher 
audit premiums (Simunic, 1980), higher earning response coefficients (Teoh and Wong, 
1993), higher litigation rates (St. Pierre and Anderson, 1984; Palmrose, 1988), lower 
earnings management (Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999), lower going concern 
error rates (Geiger and Rama, 2006), better predictive ability of future IPO performance 
(Weber and Willenborg, 2003), and are less likely to serve as a successor auditor when 
the predecessor auditor resigned (Raghunandan and Rama, 1999). 
In addition to the studies examining audit quality differences between the Big N 
and the non-Big N, another group of studies have examined audit quality around auditor 
changes.    DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) find that discretionary accruals are income 
decreasing in the year before the change and insignificant in the year of change.  
However, their study examines auditor changes during the period 1990 to 1993.  In 
                                                 




contrast, Nagy (2005) finds that discretionary accruals are actually lower for smaller 
companies who were forced to change auditors by the demise of Andersen. 
Client Retention in the Post-SOX Environment 
As noted earlier the auditing profession has undergone significant change since 
the collapse of Enron and the subsequent demise of Andersen.  Thus, the first step in my 
analysis is to gain an understanding of the client continuance process in the post-SOX 
environment. 
Methodology   
To gain insight to the client continuance process, I interview 10 Big Four audit 
partners.6  These partners are a cross section of their respective audit firms, representing a 
broad spectrum of industries including retail, manufacturing, healthcare, technology and 
financial services.  The interviewees included one national risk management partner, two 
regional risk management partners, two office managing partners and five partners 
without regional or national leadership positions.  Each of the partners has been involved 
in client retention decisions in the past year and all but one partner has been associated 
with at least one resignation in the past two years.  All interviews took place in person 
                                                 
6 While 10 is not an excessively large number of audit partners, the number is consistent with previous 
studies that employ interviews as a basis for understanding auditor decisions.  Mutchler (1984) notes that it 
is not necessary to use a large number of subjects during the discovery stage of a project.  In her paper, 
Mutchler (1984) interviews 16 audit partners, two from each of the Big Eight accounting firms, to examine 
auditors’ perception of the going-concern opinion decision.  Additionally, Huss and Jacobs (1991) 




with five of the interviews being taped.7  Handwritten notes were taken for those 
interviewees not wishing to be taped.      
These interviews consisted of two parts.  In the first part, I asked a series of open 
ended questions to determine what client factors are most important to the client 
continuance decision (i.e. what are the red flags that they look for?).  During this 
discussion, the partners were asked to not only identify what factors are most important, 
but to also discuss how these factors may be observable in publicly available disclosures.  
Additionally, I questioned the partners on how the Andersen demise and SOX had altered 
the client continuance process.  Appendix A contains the interview protocol used with 
each partner.  In the second part of the interview, I asked the audit partners to rate the 
importance of the items discussed using a five point Likert scale.  This analysis allows 
me to assess the relative importance of each of the items discussed.  See Appendix B for 
the Likert scale that was provided to each partner. 
Results 
 The presentation and discussion of the results are presented in three sections.  The 
first section discusses the interview responses, while the second section discusses the 
results of the Likert scale ratings instrument.  Finally the third section presents the 
univariate analyses and results from the multivariate analyses.    
                                                 
7 Eight of the interviews occurred in the respective partner’s office.  The remaining two interviews occurred 





 Due to the open-ended nature of the interviews and complexity of the client 
continuation process, questions often commingled and there were no simple answers to 
most questions.  Thus, I make no attempt to provide exact responses for each question 
discussed.  To facilitate discussion of the interviews, I group interview responses into 
general categories.  These categories are general groupings of the questions asked.  I start 
with a general description of each firm’s client continuance process and then move on to 
discuss specific client and engagement characteristics the partners identified as being 
important.  I conclude with a discussion of how the process has changed post-SOX.   
The Process 
 In general, partners at three of the four firms described a very similar process 
driven by their national offices.  Specifically, they described a process where shortly after 
the completion of the prior year engagement the engagement team is prompted to initiate 
the client continuance process.  The first step in the process is to populate a web-based 
database with information about the client.8  Based on the information entered into the 
database each firm generates a risk rating for each client.  Interestingly, while the audit 
partner is not allowed to lower the risk score received by a client they are allowed to 
increase the score if they believe it is too low.  This risk rating determines the level of 
internal review required to continue servicing a client and allows comparison of clients 
across the firm.  At each of the three firms, the minimum required review for a public 
client is by a regional risk management partner.  During the review process, the 
                                                 
8 The information entered into the database includes information on the client’s industry, financial 




reviewing partner(s) can request additional information about the client and, depending 
on the circumstances, may require a teleconference or meeting to discuss a specific client.   
While three of the four firms have very similar processes driven by their national 
offices, the fourth firm’s process is more regionalized and examines not only the 
particular client but also the partner’s portfolio as a whole.  At this firm, each partner 
meets once a year with the office managing partner and a regional risk partner to review 
the partner’s client portfolio.9  During these reviews, the partners discuss the specific 
risks of the client and whether they believe the firm should continue servicing that client.  
If during this meeting the partners identify a client they wish to continue servicing but 
which has a sufficiently high level of risk, they can put the client into their national risk 
management program.  This program involves the appointment of a third partner to 
provide additional guidance and the performance of additional procedures to help 
mitigate the risks identified.10      
In addition to the information noted above, there were some other interesting 
responses that deserve attention.  First, as part of the documentation to complete sign off 
on the current year audit opinion at one firm, the engagement partner is required to 
answer a question as to whether or not the audit firm should continue servicing the audit 
client.   Additionally, it was interesting to note that several partners indicated that the 
decision to not continue servicing a client is usually made prior to starting the 
continuance process for the client.  That is, the partner knew at the end of the engagement 
whether or not the client met the profile of a client the audit firm wanted to continue 
                                                 
9 While the partners at this firm do populate the database with financial information on each of their clients, 
this firm does not generate a risk rating based on that information.   
10 Due to my agreement with the audit partners prior to the interview process, I am not able to identify 




servicing.  They indicated that the process primarily provided the documentation of the 
decision and a system of checks to ensure that partners across the firm were using similar 
metrics to determine which clients to service.  Finally, I asked the partners what type of 
risk they were most concerned about when making client continuance decisions.  All 
except two partners stated that there biggest concern was the litigation or perception risk 
associated with restatements.  The remaining two partners considered management 
integrity to be their biggest concern.   
Client Characteristics 
 During the second part of the interview, the partners were asked to identify the 
key factors/characteristics that they/their firm find important when deciding whether or 
not to continue servicing a client.   All interviewees identified the same basic items as 
important to the decision to continue servicing the client.  These items can be broken 
down into four basic groupings: (1) management, (2) financial health, (3) general 
company characteristics and (4) governance. 
  The first group of characteristics identified are those related to the management of 
the client.  The partners consistently listed management’s integrity, attitude toward 
financial reporting and competence as the key determinants of the decision to continue 
servicing the client.  They went on to indicate that determining the integrity and 
competence of management was the most difficult task they had to perform.  Finally, 
several partners noted that turnover in the key management personnel creates significant 




turnover of key management personnel led to the client being treated as if they were a 
new client and not a continuing client.   
 The second group of characteristics identified were those related to the financial 
health of the client.  The partners consistently identified high distress, high leverage, low 
profitability and poor cash flow companies as clients they would consider resigning from.   
In addition to the financial health of the company, the partners also found several 
general company characteristics as important determinants of the decision to continue 
servicing a client.  First, the partners identified the existence of a sufficient number of 
competent personnel as a significant issue.  During the interviews, the partners indicated 
that the independence provisions of SOX have prevented the audit firms from providing 
accounting assistance and guidance to their clients.  Thus, the quality of the client’s 
personnel has become a significant issue post-SOX.  Additionally, the partners identified 
the existence of poor internal controls as another key indicator that they would consider 
resigning.  A third factor identified by the partners was litigation risk.  Interestingly, the 
partners indicated that the litigation risk could result form actual audit risk or reputation 
risk.  Partners at two of the firms stated that their firm had decided to stop performing 
work for sub-prime lenders and internet gambling companies because the firm believed 
association with companies in these industries could be detrimental to the firm’s 
reputation.  The partners also indicated that the existence of significant related party 
transactions was another key indicator that they should consider resigning.  Finally, the 
partners indicated that they had to evaluate the strain the client puts on the audit firm’s 




issue for the audit firms post-SOX and that they could no longer tolerate clients who were 
difficult to deal with or who put unnecessary strain on their audit firm’s staff. 
 The final group of characteristics identified related to the client’s governance.  
Several audit partners identified the competence, diligence and objectivity of the 
company’s audit committee to be very important to the decision to continue servicing.  
Interestingly, two audit partners indicated that they did not consider the audit committee 
to be a very important part of the process.  These partners indicated that a “good” audit 
committee would be great, but that the existence of a “bad” audit committee would not be 
a reason to stop servicing a client.  In contrast, another audit partner indicated that he was 
aware of a situation where an audit partner in his firm actually spoke with the board about 
the lack of involvement by the audit committee and indicated that if the audit committee 
did not take a more active role the firm would consider resigning from the client.    
 Engagement Characteristics 
 In addition to the client characteristics noted above, the partners also identified 
several engagement characteristics that were important to the client continuance decision.  
First, the partners indicated that they must have personnel with sufficient expertise.  
Specifically, one partner indicated that from a risk management standpoint it was not 
effective to retain a client for which you don’t have sufficient expertise to mitigate the 
client’s risk.  Additionally, the partners indicated that you must have an audit fee that is 
appropriate for the level of audit risk.  Several partners indicated that their firm had 
general expectations for audit profitability post-SOX and that this had required audit fees 





 In general, all the partners indicated that the client continuance process had 
become more formal and rigorous post-SOX.  One partner indicated that the events 
surrounding the collapse of Andersen had opened a lot of partners’ eyes as to the effect 
one “bad” client can have on the entire partnership.  Thus, leading to a process where the 
continuance decision is viewed with a more critical eye by both the engagement partner 
and the risk partners reviewing the continuance decisions.  The partners also indicated 
that the level of sign-off required for a continuing client had increased post-SOX and that 
everything was scrutinized to eliminate undue risk.  Specifically, the partners indicated 
that the minimum required review for a public client is by a regional risk partner as 
compared to pre-SOX when the minimum review may have been as low as an office 
managing partner.  Additionally, they indicated that the importance of internal controls 
and the audit committee had increased dramatically post-SOX.  Interestingly, one partner 
indicated that he believed the PCAOB inspections had been a significant factor in the 
increase in documentation of the continuance decision.  Finally, the partners all agreed 
that the inability of the audit firms to retain sufficient personnel had led audit firms to 
examine how much strain a particular client puts on the staff of the firm.   
Likert Scale Results 
 While the interviews with the partners allowed me to understand what 
factors/characteristics the partners considered important to the client continuance 
decision, it does not provide me with a ranking of factors/characteristics.  As noted 




the importance of each item.  Table 1 presents the frequencies and mean response for 
each factor/characteristic related to the client continuance decision.   
 As can be seen from Table 1, only one item had a mean response of greater than 
2.5 indicating that they were all considered on average important or very important to the 
client continuance decision.  Not surprisingly, management characteristics were some of 
the most important items with management integrity being rated very important by every 
partner.  Interestingly, the availability of appropriate audit personnel rated on average as 
high as the internal controls and financial health of the company.  Finally, the importance 
of the audit committee was rated on average higher than the profitability of the 
engagement. 
Univariate and Multivariate Analyses 
Variable and Hypotheses Development 
In the first part of the paper, I ask audit partners to identify the 
factors/characteristics of clients that would be indicators that the audit firm should 
consider resignation.  Based on the responses from the audit partners, I develop a model 
of auditor resignation.  To develop this model, I identify proxies for the 
factors/characteristics that the partners indicated were important to the client continuance 
decision.  As noted earlier, the partners identified four main groupings of 
factors/characteristics that are important to the client continuance decision.  I use these 
grouping to identify the variables I use as proxies for the factors/characteristics identified.   
The first group the partners identified related to the management of the company.  




toward financial reporting.  While the integrity and attitude of management is not a 
simple characteristic to capture, I use the company’s level of earnings management to 
proxy for the aggressiveness of management toward financial reporting.  Specifically, I 
classify companies in the top three earnings management deciles as having a high level of 
earnings management.  Consistent with my discussion with the partners and previous 
literature which finds that resignation companies are more likely to have high earnings 
management (DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998), I expect that if a company is in the top 
three deciles of earning management the probability of resignation increases.  This leads 
to my first hypothesis (expressed in alternate form): 
H1a:  There is a significant positive relation between the presence of high levels  
           of earnings management and the probability of resignation.   
 
In addition to the decile of earnings management, the partners also indicated that 
the existence of an adverse internal control opinion would be a good proxy for a lack of 
commitment by management toward accurate financial statements.  Previous literature 
has noted that resignation companies are more likely to have internal control deficiencies 
(Lee et al. 2004; Hertz, 2005; Ettredge et al. 2005).   Building on the previous literature 
and my interviews, I expect that audit firms are more likely to resign from companies 
with internal control deficiencies.  This leads to my second hypothesis (expressed in 
alternate form): 
H1b:  There is a significant positive relation between the existence of an adverse  
           internal control opinion and the probability of resignation.11  
  
                                                 
11 My sample period is 2003 to 2005.  During this period, some companies are not subject to the internal 
control reporting requirements of section 404 of SOX.  For these companies, I use the existence of an 




Finally, I also identify companies who have added a new member to the 
management team in the past year.  As noted during the interview process, turnover in 
key management personnel creates significant uncertainty for the audit firm.  Thus, one 
could expect a company with turnover in its key management personnel to have a higher 
probability of resignation.  This leads to my third hypothesis (expressed in alternate 
form): 
H1c:  There is a significant positive relation between the existence of a new  
          member of management and the probability of resignation.12 
 
  The second group of items identified by the partners relates to the financial 
health of the company.  As noted earlier, the partners consistently identified high distress, 
high leverage, low profitability and poor cash flow companies as clients they would 
examine carefully.  This leads to my fourth and fifth hypotheses: (expressed in alternate 
form): 
H2a:  There is a significant positive relation between distress and the probability  
           of resignation; 
 
H2b:  There is a significant positive relation between leverage and the probability  
           of resignation.  
 
In addition to these variables, I also include variables to capture whether or not 
the company is profitable and whether it has negative cash flow from operations.  This 
leads to my next two hypotheses (expressed in alternate form): 
H2c:  There is a significant positive relation between existence of a loss and the  
           probability of resignation; 
 
H2d:  There is a significant positive relation between the existence of negative  
           cash flow from operations and the probability of resignation. 
                                                 
12 In untabulated results, I recode this variable as a dichotomous variable which is coded 1 if the company 





Finally, I include a variable to capture the overall financial health of the company.  
Specifically, I include a variable to identify companies who receive a going-concern 
opinion.  Previous literature on resignations has indicated that the probability of 
resignation increases for firms with a prior going concern opinion (Krishnan and 
Krishnan, 1997; Lee et al. 2004).  This leads to my next hypothesis (expressed in 
alternate form): 
H2e:  There is a significant positive relation between the existence of a prior year  
           going-concern opinion and the probability of resignation; 
 
The third group of factors/characteristics identified by the partners relates to the 
competence of company personnel, internal controls, the litigation risk associated with 
the company’s industry, related party transactions and the strain the client puts on the 
audit staff.  During my interviews with the partners, several partners indicated that a 
restatement would be a good proxy for a company who did not have competent 
personnel.  This leads to my next hypothesis (expressed in alternate form): 
H3a:  There is a significant positive relation between restatement and the  
           probability of resignation. 
 
As noted in H1b, I use the presence of an internal control deficiency to proxy for 
the commitment of management toward accurate financial reporting.  I also use this 
variable as a second proxy for a lack of sufficient competent personnel.  I predict the 
same relation for this variable as in H1b.   
In addition to these variables related to the competency of client personnel, I also 
include a variable to capture a company’s litigation risk.  Specifically, I calculate each 




company with a probability greater than 50 percent as having high litigation risk.  The 
previous literature on resignations has found that resignation firms are more likely to be 
in high litigation industries (Krishnan and Krishnan, 1997; Shu, 2000; Lee et al., 2004).  
This leads to my next hypothesis (expressed in alternate form): 
H3b:  There is a significant positive relation between a company with high  
           litigation risk and the probability of resignation. 
   
Additionally, the partners identified the existence of significant related party 
transactions as another indicator of possible resignation.  As such, I include the number 
of related party transactions in the model.  This leads to my next hypothesis (expressed in 
alternate form): 
H3c:  There is a significant positive relation between the number of related party  
          transactions and the probability of resignation. 
 
Finally, I use the audit lag as a proxy for the strain the client puts on the audit 
staff.  This is consistent with prior literature which documents that resignation firms are 
more likely to have a longer audit lag (Schwartz and Soo, 1996; Schloetzer, 2005).  This 
leads to my next hypothesis (expressed in alternate form): 
H3d:  There is a significant positive relation between the audit lag and the  
           probability of resignation. 
 
 The final group of items identified by management relate to the governance of the 
company.  These items primarily focus on the audit committee.  Based on the results of 
my interviews, I include variables related to the objectivity, diligence and expertise of the 
audit committee.  Consistent with prior literature, I expect resignation firms to be less 
likely to have a fully independent audit committee (Lee et al. 2004), less likely to have a 




their audit committee (Lee et al. 2004).  This leads to my next three hypotheses 
(expressed in alternate form): 
H4a:  There is a significant negative relation between the existence of a fully  
           independent audit committee and the probability of resignation; 
   
H4b:  There is a significant positive relation between the existence of an audit  
           committee that meets less than four times per year and the probability of  
           resignation; 
 
H4c:  There is a significant negative relation between the existence of a financial  
           expert on the audit committee and the probability of resignation. 
 
In addition to the company characteristics identified by the partners, they also 
identified the profitability of the engagement as an additional factor affecting the decision 
to continue servicing a client.  I use two variables to capture the profitability of an 
engagement.  The first variable is the unexpected portion of audit fees.  Consistent with 
prior literature, I expect that resignation firms will have lower unexpected audit fees 
(Ettredge et al. 2005).   This leads to my next hypothesis (expressed in alternate form): 
H5a:  There is a significant negative relation between unexpected audit fees and  
           the probability of resignation.13 
 
In addition to the unexpected portion of audit fees, I also use a variable to capture 
the level of non-audit work performed by the audit firm.  Even though the level of non-
audit work has been greatly reduced post-SOX one could expect that an audit firm would 
                                                 
13 The unexpected component of audit fees is calculated using the following model:  LAF = b0 + b1LTA + 
b2RECINV + b3CATA + b4QUICK + b5DE + b6ROI + b7FOREIGN + b8GC + b9YE + b10LOSS + b11BIG4 
+ b12SIC49 + b13LNTENURE, where LAF = natural log of audit fees, LTA = natural log of assets, 
RECINV = percentage of total assets in receivables and inventories, CATA = ratio of current assets to total 
assets, QUICK = ratio of current assets (less inventories) to current liabilities, DE = ratio of long-term debt 
to total assets, ROI = earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets, FOREIGN = 1 if the 
company has foreign operations, GC = 1 if the company received a going-concern opinion, YE = 1 if the 
company has a non December 31 year end, LOSS = 1 if loss in current fiscal year, BIG4 = 1 if auditor is 
one of the Big Four audit firms, SIC49 = 1 if observation is in the utilities industry and LNTENURE = 
natural log of the number of years with the same auditor. This model is consistent with the model reported 




have more economic ties to a client for which it still performs non-audit work than a 
client for which it does not.  This leads to my next hypothesis (expressed in alternate 
form): 
H5b:  There is a significant negative relation between non-audit fees and the  
           probability of resignation.14 
 
Finally, I control for the size of the company as previous literature has noted that 
resignation companies are smaller (Lee et al., 2004). 
Univariate Analysis 
It is important to test whether audit firms are systematically making resignation 
decisions based on the factors their audit partners considered most important.  To conduct 
this analysis, I use Audit Analytics to select a sample of 200 auditor resignations from all 
Big Four and National audit firm resignations between January 1, 2003 and December 
31, 2005.15  To provide a baseline for comparison, I employ a matched control sample 
selected from all companies who did not change auditors during the sample time period.  
The control sample is matched to the test sample based on year, audit firm, industry and 
performance.16 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the company characteristics.  As 
expected, resignation companies are smaller (p < 0.01), have a longer audit lag (p < 
0.01), are less likely to have a financial expert on their audit committee (p < 0.10) and 
                                                 
14 In untabulated results, I replace the natural log of non-audit fees with the ratio of non-audit fees to audit 
fees.  Results are quantitatively similar.  
15 There are approximately 420 audit firm resignations (350 Big Four and 70 National) between January 1, 
2003 and December 31, 2005.  I limit my analysis to Big Four and National audit firms since smaller audit 
firms are less likely to have similar processes. 
16 For matching purposes, performance is defined as return on assets.  After eliminating all control 
companies from different years, audit firms and industries, the test company is matched with the control 
firm which has the closest return on assets to the test firm.  In all cases, the control company’s return on 




more likely to have high levels of earnings management (p < 0.10) than companies who 
are retained by their audit firms. 17  Additionally, resignation firms were almost three 
times more likely to have an internal control deficiency (p < 0.01), restate their financial 
statements (p < 0.01) and receive a going-concern opinion (p < 0.01) than the retained 
companies.  Finally, it is interesting to note that resignation firms have significantly 
lower non-audit fees (p < 0.01) than retained companies.  This seems to indicate the 
possibility that auditors give some client retention preferences to clients for which they 
provide a greater amount of non-audit services.  These results provide initial evidence 
that the partners are systematically using many of the factors/characteristics they 
identified to make client continuance decisions.   
Table 3 presents the correlations among the independent variables.  All except 
nine of the correlations fall between +/- 0.40, which appears to suggest that the variables 
measure distinct features.  Five of the correlations greater than +/- 0.40 are between SIZE 
and another independent variable.  The only other variables with a correlation greater 
than +/- 0.40 are those between DISTRESS and LEVERAGE (0.4140) LOSS and 
NEG_CF (0.5410), NEG_CF and HIGH_EM (0.4150) and LOSS and HIGH_PROB_LIT 
(0.5484).  These relationships are not unexpected, considering that the debt to assets ratio 
is a component of DISTRESS and having a loss increases the chance of litigation.  Given 
these relatively high correlations, I calculate variance inflation factors (VIF) for all 
                                                 
17 I do not discuss the results for LEVERAGE or ABN_AUDITFEES, since there is not consistent evidence 




models and find that the highest VIF is 1.97, which is within acceptable limits.18  Thus, 
multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem in any of my models. 
Model 
To determine if client factors identified by the partners are diagnostic of auditor 
resignations, I use the following matched-pairs logit regression model19: 
RESIGN = b0 + b1IC_DEF + b2NEW + b3NEG_CF + b4DISTRESS + b5GC +  
       b6LEVERAGE + b7LOSS + b8RESTATE + b9RELATED_PARTY +  
       b10AUDIT_LAG + b11AC_IND + b12AC_MEET + b13FE +  
       b14ABN_AUDITFEES + b15NONAUDITFEES + b16SIZE + b17HIGH_EM +  
       b18HIGH_PROB_LIT + e 
 











1 if any of the disclosed members of management was new to 











the probability of bankruptcy calculated using Zmijewski’s 
(1984) financial distress score; 
GC  = 1 if the company received a going-concern opinion, 0 otherwise; 
LEVERAGE   = the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 





1 if the company restated their financial statements in the year 
prior to the resignation, 0 otherwise; 





the natural log of the number of calendar days from the fiscal 





1 if the audit committee is 100 percent independent, 0 
otherwise; 







1 if at least one member of the audit committee is disclosed by 
the company as a financial expert or has experience as a CFO, 
Accountant, VP of Finance, CPA, or Controller, 0 otherwise; 
ABN_AUDITFEES  = the natural log of the unexpected component of audit fees; 
                                                 
18 According to Gujuarati (1995, 339), multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem as long as VIF are less 
than 10.0.   




NONAUDITFEES  = the natural log of non-audit fees; 









1 if the decile of the company’s absolute value of performance 
adjusted discretionary accruals from the modified Jones model 






1 if the probability of litigation calculated using Stice (1991) 
litigation score is greater than 0.50, 0 otherwise; 
 
The model above is the complete model.  However the HIGH_EM variable is not 
appropriate for companies in the financial services and insurance industries.  There are 20 
matched pairs (40 companies) from the financial services and insurance industries in my 
initial sample.  Additionally, 59 of the matched pairs (118 companies) in my sample do 
not have the data to compute Stice’s litigation score (HIGH_PROB_LIT).  Based on this 
information, I run four models.  The first model excludes the HIGH_EM and 
HIGH_PROB_LIT variable, but includes the complete sample of 400 companies.  The 
second model adds the HIGH_EM model to the first model and drops observations in the 
financial services and insurance industries.  The third model adds the HIGH_PROB_LIT 
to the first model and excludes observations that do not have data to calculate Stice’s 
litigation score.  The final model adds both HIGH_EM and HIGH_PROB_LIT, but is 
limited to observations that are not in the financial services and insurance industries 
which have the data to calculate Stice’s litigation score. 
Matched-Pairs Logistic Analysis 
Table 4 includes the results from the four logistic regressions.  As noted earlier, 
Model 1 excludes the HIGH_EM and HIGH_PROB_LIT variables.  The overall model is 
                                                 
20 In untabulated results, I recode HIGH_EM to be equal to 1 if the company’s decile of accruals is greater 




significant (p < 0.01) and the pseudo R2 is 35.76%.  As expected, resignation firms are 
less likely to have management who are committed to accurate financial reporting, as 
evidenced by resignation firms being more likely to have an internal control deficiency (p 
< 0.05) and to have restated their financial statements (p < 0.10).  Resignation clients also 
put more strain on the audit firms and are less profitable than are retained clients, as 
exhibited by the significantly longer audit lag (p < 0.01) and lower non-audit fees (p < 
0.05).  Additionally, resignation clients are in poor financial health.  Specifically, 
resignation clients are more likely to have a going concern opinion (p < 0.01) and higher 
leverage (p < 0.05) than retained companies.  Finally, resignation firms are smaller (p < 
0.01) than companies who are retained. 
Next, I add HIGH_EM to Model 1.  Model 2 is significant (p < 0.01) with a 
pseudo R2 of 37.82%. As expected, HIGH_EM is positive and significant (p < 0.10) 
indicating resignation companies have more aggressive financial reporting behavior than 
retained firms.  All other variables are consistent with the results reported in Model 1.   
In Model 3, I add HIGH_PROB_LIT to Model 1.  The overall model is significant 
(p < 0.01) and the pseudo R2 is 37.33%.  The new variable HIGH_PROB_LIT is not 
significant at any conventional level.  All other variables are consistent with the results 
reported in Model 1 with the exception of NONAUDITFEES, which is no longer 
significant at any conventional level. 
Finally, I add both HIGH_EM and HIGH_PROB_LIT to Model 1.  Model 4 is 
significant (p < 0.01) and has a pseudo R2 of 40.15%, which is higher than any other 




Overall, these results appear to indicate that resignation companies have less 
accurate financial reporting (H1a, H1b, and H3a) put significant strain on audit firms 
(H3d), are less profitable (H2c) and have weaker financial performance (H2b and H2e) 
than retained companies.  Additionally, these results suggest that the audit partners are 
consistently using many of the factors identified to make client continuance decisions.  In 
the post-SOX period, auditor independence has been a key concern of regulators.  It is 
interesting to note that I find a significant negative relation between non-audit fees and 
the resignation decision in the univariate results and in models 1 and 2 of the multivariate 
results.  However, this result does not hold in models 3 and 4 of the multivariate analyses.  
To attempt to understand the contrasting non-audit fee results, I run models 1 and 2 on 
the reduced sample used in model 4.  Non-audit fees are not significant at any 
conventional level in these models.  This result appears to indicate that the positive 
relation between non-audit fees and client retention is limited to 146 observations which 
do not have sufficient data to calculate the probability of litigation.21  
Do Audit Firms Retain Better Clients? 
In the first part of this paper, I examine which of the factors identified by the audit 
partners are most important in predicting auditor resignations.  However, this analysis 
only identifies the actual factors used by auditors when making the client retention 
decision, it does not examine whether or not the audit firm made the appropriate decision.  
As noted earlier, previous literature has examined the characteristics of companies whose 
                                                 
21 It is also interesting to note that the 146 companies which do not have the data to calculate the probability 
of litigation have mean non-audit fees which are approximately $70,000 higher than the 254 companies that 




auditor resigns.  However, little research has examined the subsequent performance of 
these companies to determine if audit firms are effective at disassociating themselves 
from clients with elevated risk.   
Methodology 
To determine if auditors are effective at resigning from clients with elevated risk, 
I examine the differences between resignation and retained companies based on a 
multitude of future financial performance and risk measures.  These measures include 
return on assets, abnormal accruals, financial distress, delisting, restatement, going 
concern status, and litigation risk.22  This analysis is first performed using one year of 
future performance, with subsequent analysis examining two years of future performance.  
I employ two samples to perform this analysis.  First, I compare all resignation firms to 
all non-resignation firms, hereafter referred to as the full sample.23  Specifically, I employ 
univariate analysis to examine whether non-resignation companies have better future 
performance than resignation companies.  For the second part of this analysis, I use a 
multivariate t-test to examine the relation between the future performance measures and 
the retention decision holding all else equal.  Specifically, I employ a matched sample of 
200 Big Four and National audit firm resignations between January 1, 2003 and 
December 31, 2005.  Each sample resignation firm is matched with a non-resignation 
                                                 
22 I had originally intended to include bankruptcy data, however none of the companies in the matched 
sample filed for bankruptcy in either of the two years of future performance I examined.  Additionally, I 
did not collect the bankruptcy measure for the entire population due to time required to hand collect this 
measure for a large sample of companies. 
23 I use Compustat to identify all companies, audited by Big Four and National audit firms, who do not 




firm based on year, audit firm, industry and performance.24  Using this sample, I employ 
matched-pairs logistic regression to compare the retained companies to the resignation 
companies based on future performance measures and size using the following model: 
RETAIN = b0 + b1SIZE_AFTER + b2ROA_AFTER + b3DISTRESS_AFTER +  
           b4DELIST_AFTER + b5RESTATE_AFTER + b6GC_AFTER +  
         b7LOSS_AFTER + b8IC_DEF_AFTER + b9EM_AFTER +  
       b10PROB_LIT_AFTER + e 
 
RETAIN  = 1 if the company is retained by the audit firm, 0 otherwise; 
SIZE_AFTER  = the natural log of assets; 





the probability of bankruptcy calculated using Zmijewski’s 











1 if company restated their financial statements in the year 





1 if company received a going-concern opinion in the year 
after the resignation; 





1 if the company reports a deficiency in its internal 







the decile of the company’s absolute value of performance 
adjusted discretionary accruals from the modified Jones 





the probability of litigation calculated using Stice’s (1991) 
litigation score. 
 
All variables are measured in the year after resignation.  In subsequent analysis, I limit 
the sample to firms with two years of future performance to see if the results are sensitive 
to using one year of subsequent performance.25 
                                                 
24 This sample is the same as the sample used for the first analysis of this paper. 
25 For the two year model, return on assets, abnormal accruals, financial distress, and litigation risk are 
calculated as the average of each measure for the two years following the resignation.  In contrast, 
delisting, restatement, going concern status, net loss, and internal control deficiency are dichotomous 





If audit firms are doing a good job at making client retention decisions, one would 
expect the retained client to have better future performance than the dismissed clients.  
This leads me to my research question:  
R1:  Do audit firms retain better performing clients? 
Results First Year After 
Panel A of Table 5 presents the results of the univariate analysis for the full 
sample.  As can be seen in Table 5, the resignation clients are significantly smaller (p < 
0.01) than the retained clients.  The resignation clients also perform significantly worse 
than the retained companies on all characteristic analyzed.  Specifically, resignation 
companies have almost a -90% ROA as compared to retained firm who have only a -5% 
ROA (p < 0.01).  Resignation companies are more than twice as likely to receive a going 
concern opinion (p < 0.01), delist (p < 0.01), have a loss (p < 0.01), restate their financial 
statements (p < 0.01) and have an internal control deficiency (p < 0.01) as retained firms.  
Additionally, resignation firms have more than two times the probability of bankruptcy, 
DISTRESS_AFTER, (p < 0.01) and litigation (p < 0.01) as retained firms.  Finally, 
resignation companies have higher levels of earnings management (p < 0.01) as 
compared to the retained firms.  Panel B of Table 5 provides the univariate results for the 
matched sample.  Results from the matched sample are consistent with those from the full 
sample with the exception of DELIST_AFTER and PROB_LIT_AFTER which are not 
significant at any conventional level in the matched sample.   
Table 6 presents the correlations among the independent variables.  All except six 




appears to suggest that the variables measure distinct features.  The only variable with a 
correlation greater than +/- 0.50 is between LOSS_AFTER and ROA_AFTER (-0.8351).  
This relationship is not surprising given that companies with a loss must have negative 
ROA.  Given these relatively high correlations, I calculate variance inflation factors 
(VIF) for all models and find that the highest VIF is 1.96, which is within acceptable 
limits. Thus, multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem in any of my models. 
Table 7 presents the results from the matched-pairs logistic regressions.  
Consistent with the analysis performed in Table 4, Model 1 excludes the EM_AFTER 
and PROB_LIT_AFTER variables.  The overall model is significant (p < 0.01) and has a 
pseudo R2 of 26.97%.  Consistent with the notion that audit firms retain better clients, the 
results indicate that retained clients are larger (p < 0.01), less likely to have a going 
concern opinion (p < 0.05) and less likely to have an internal control deficiency (p < 
0.01).  In Model 2 and 3, I add the EM_AFTER and PROB_LIT_AFTER variables to 
Model 1, respectively.  Neither the EM_AFTER nor the PROB_LIT_AFTER variable is 
significant at any conventional level.  All other results are consistent with those reported 
in Model 1, with the exception of GC_AFTER in Model 3 which is no longer significant 
at the 10% level.  In Model 4, I add both the EM_AFTER and PROB_LIT_AFTER 
variables to Model 1.  Results are consistent with those previously reported.  Overall, the 





 Results Second Year After 
Requiring companies to have two years of future data reduces the sample size 
from 200 matched pairs to 97 matched pairs.  Panel A of Table 8 presents the results of 
the univariate analysis for the full sample. Consistent with the results presented in Table 
5, resignation clients performed significantly worse than the retained companies on all 
characteristic analyzed.  Specifically, resignation companies have a -122% ROA as 
compared to retained firm who have only a -9% ROA (p < 0.01).  Resignation companies 
are more than twice as likely to receive a going concern opinion (p < 0.01), delist (p < 
0.01), have a loss (p < 0.01), restate their financial statements (p < 0.01) and have an 
internal control deficiency (p < 0.01) as retained firms.  Additionally, resignation firms 
have more than three times the probability of bankruptcy, DISTRESS_AFTER, (p < 
0.01) and almost two times the probability of litigation (p < 0.01) as retained firms.  
Finally, resignation companies have higher levels of earnings management (p < 0.01) and 
are smaller (p < 0.01) than retained clients.  Panel B of Table 8 provides the univariate 
results for the matched sample.  Results from the matched sample are consistent with 
those from the full sample with the exception of LOSS_AVG and PROB_LIT_AVG 
which are not significant at any conventional level in the matched sample.   
Table 9 presents the correlations among the independent variables.  All except 
nine of the correlations fall between +/- 0.40 and only four of those are greater than +/- 
0.50.  The correlations greater than +/- 0.50 are between SIZE_AVG and 
PROB_LIT_AVG (-0.5014), LOSS_AVG and ROA_AVG (-0.7652), DISTRESS_AVG 




relatively high correlations, I calculate variance inflation factors (VIF) for all models and 
find that the highest VIF is 2.09, which is within acceptable limits.  Thus, 
multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem in any of my models. 
Table 10 presents the results from the matched-pairs logistic analysis.  Consistent 
with the analysis performed in Table 4 and Table 7, Model 1 excludes the EM_AVG and 
PROB_LIT_AVG variables.  The overall model is significant (p < 0.01) and has a pseudo 
R2 of 55.58%.  Consistent with the notion that audit firms retain better clients, the results 
indicate that retained clients are larger (p < 0.01), less likely to have a going concern 
opinion (p < 0.05) and less likely to have an internal control deficiency (p < 0.01).  In 
Model 2, I add EM_AVG variable to Model 1.  While EM_AVG is not significant, 
DISTRESS_AVG and DELIST_AVG become marginally significant (p < 0.10).  All 
other results are consistent with those reported in Model 1.  In Model 3, I add 
PROB_LIT_AVG to Model 1.  PROB_LIT_AVG is not significant.  All other results are 
consistent with those in Model 1 with the exception of GC_AVG, which is no longer 
significant at any conventional level.  Results from Model 4 are consistent with those 
already discussed.  Overall, the results from the first year after and second year after 
analyses appear to provide consistent results that retained clients have better subsequent 
financial performance than resignation clients. 
Why Do Audit Firms Retain Some Risky Clients While 
Dismissing Others? 
While my second analysis identifies whether large accounting firms are retaining 




later are shown to be more risky.  Previous accounting research has identified financial 
restatements as being significantly related to audit firm litigation (Kinney and McDaniel, 
1989; Palmrose and Scholz, 2004).  Thus, one example of a “risky” client from which an 
audit firm might wish to resign is one who subsequently has to restate their financial 
statements.  Based on this information, I use a sample of firms with subsequent 
restatements, some of which the auditors had retained and some who were let go, to 
examine why audit firms fail to resign from some clients that later are shown to have 
increased litigation risk.   
Methodology 
To accomplish this analysis I use a matched sample of companies that have 
restated their financial statements.26  The sample consists of all Big Four and National 
audit clients that were dismissed by their auditors between January 1, 2003 and 
December 31, 2005 and which subsequent to the dismissal restated their financial 
statements.  This sample is matched based on year, auditor type (Big Four or National), 
industry, and performance with a restatement company whose auditor did not resign.27  
Using this matched sample, I use matched pairs logistic regression to explore why 
the factors identified by audit partners as being associated with resignation during the 
interviews are effective at identifying some firms who restate their financial statements, 
                                                 
26 Consistent with prior literature (e.g. Palmrose and Scholz, 2004), I limit my sample of restatements to 
those restatements that relate to published financial statements items.  Thus, restatements related to 
earnings announcements, subsequent events, retroactive restatements in accordance with GAAP and similar 
items are excluded from the sample.  Additionally, I exclude restatements related to lease expenses due to 
recent concerns that these restatements may not be of equal severity as other financial restatements (Taub, 
2005).   
27 For companies with multiple restatements during the sample period, I limit my analysis to the first 




but not others.  In addition to the factors identified by the audit partners during the 
interviews, the model includes factors which prior accounting literature has found to be 
associated with financial restatements.  Previous literature has documented that 
restatement companies are younger (Abbott et al., 2004), smaller (Turner and Sennetti, 
2001), have more leverage (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1991), have more diffuse ownership 
(DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1991; Abbott et al. 2004), are less likely to have an independent 
and active audit committee (Abbott et al., 2004), are less likely to have an audit 
committee with at least one member with financial expertise (Abbott et al., 2004), and are 
slower growing (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1991) than industry or control counterparts.   
Given that the probability of restatement at the time of the resignation decision 
may be highly correlated with the other independent variables in this model, I control for 
the probability of restatement at the time of the resignation decision.  To estimate the 
probability of restatement, I use the model developed by Turner and Sennetti (2001).28  
Using the coefficients from their model, I calculate the probability of restatement for each 
sample company.   
I use the following matched-pairs logistic regression model to examine the 
differences between restatement firms who are dismissed and restatement firms who are 
retained:          
MISSED = b0 + b1IC_DEF + b2NEW + b3NEG_CF + b4DISTRESS + b5GC +    
       b6LEVERAGE + b7LOSS + b8RELATED_PARTY + b9AUDIT_LAG +  
       b10AC_IND + b11AC_MEET + b12FE + b13ABN_AUDITFEES +  
       b14NONAUDITFEES + b15SIZE + b16AGE + b17BLOCK + b18GROWTH +  
       b19PROB_RESTATE + b20HIGH_EM + b21HIGH_PROB_LIT + e 
                                                 
28 Turner and Sennetti (2001) model restatement using the following model: RESTATE = -0.0213 + 
12.1542*NIAT + -11.4571*NIEQ + 54.4958*NI2/(AT*EQ), where RESTATE = 1 if the company restated, 












1 if the company restated their financial statements and the audit 












1 if any of the disclosed members of management was new to 











the probability of bankruptcy calculated using Zmijewski’s 
(1984) financial distress score; 
GC  = 1 if the company received a going-concern opinion, 0 otherwise; 
LEVERAGE   = the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 
LOSS  = 1 if the company reports a negative income, 0 otherwise; 





the natural log of the number of calendar days from the fiscal 





1 if the audit committee is 100 percent independent, 0 
otherwise; 







1 if at least one member of the audit committee is disclosed by 
the company as a financial expert or has experience as a CFO, 
Accountant, VP of Finance, CPA, or Controller, 0 otherwise; 
ABN_AUDITFEES  = the natural log of the unexpected component of audit fees; 
NONAUDITFEES  = the natural log of non-audit fees29; 





the natural log of the number of years the company has had 







the cumulative percentage of outstanding common stock shares 
held by 5 percent plus blockholders not affiliated with 
management (Compact D); 







the estimated probability of restatement at the resignation 










1 if the decile of the company’s absolute value of performance 
adjusted discretionary accruals from the modified Jones model 






1 if the probability of litigation calculated using Stice (1991) 
litigation score is greater than 0.50, 0 otherwise. 
                                                 
29 In untabulated results, I replace the natural log of non-audit fees with the ratio of non-audit fees to audit 





Items b1 thru b15, b20 and b21 are from Table 4 and represent factors which were 
identified by the audit partners during the interview process as being important to the 
client retention decision.30  In contrast, items b16 thru b18 represent additional factors 
which prior literature has found to be associated with financial restatements and which 
were not identified by the audit partners.  All variables are measured in the year prior to 
the resignation.  Given that this is an exploratory analysis to determine which factors are 
effective at identifying restatement companies which are retained, I do not make any 
predictions as to which factors will be effective. 
 Results 
Table 11 presents descriptive statistics for the company characteristics.  
Interestingly, companies who are missed are larger (p < 0.10), have higher non-audit fees 
(p < 0.05), have shorter audit lags (p < 0.05), have nearly half the probability of having 
an internal control deficiency (p < 0.10), and are approximately one-third less likely to 
have a going concern opinion (p < 0.01) as compared to those companies who are 
dismissed.31 
Table 12 presents the correlations between the dependent variables.  All except 
twelve of the correlations fall between +/- 0.40, which appears to suggest that the 
variables measure distinct features.  Six of the correlations greater than +/- 0.40 are 
                                                 
30 In constructing this sample, I only use a company’s first restatement during the time period under 
examination.  As such no companies have restatement in the prior period and that variable, b8 from Table 
4, is excluded from this analysis.   
31 I do not discuss the result for DISTRESS, since there is not consistent evidence that it is significant.  
Additionally, the results for SIZE and NONAUDITFEES are stronger when examining the medians instead 




between SIZE and another independent variable.  The only other variables with 
correlations greater than +/- 0.40 are those between DISTRESS and GC (0.4448), 
NEG_CF and LOSS (0.5220), NEG_CF and HIG_PROB_LIT (0.4200), LOSS and 
GROWTH (-0.4496), LOSS and PROB_RESTATE (0.4486) and LOSS and 
HIGH_PROB_LIT (0.4175).  These relationships are not unexpected.  Given these 
relatively high correlations, I calculate variance inflation factors (VIF) for all models and 
find that the highest VIF is 2.81, which is within acceptable limits.  Thus, 
multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem in any of my models. 
Table 13 presents the results from the matched-pairs logistic regression.  
Consistent with Table 4, the first model excludes both HIGH_EM and 
HIGH_PROB_LIT.  Model 1 is significant (p < 0.01) and has a pseudo R2 of 30.33%.  
Companies who are missed are larger (p < 0.01), have lower unexpected audit fees (p < 
0.10) and are less likely to have a going concern opinion (p < 0.05) than companies who 
are dismissed.  Additionally, there is marginal evidence that companies who are missed 
are less likely to have an internal control deficiency (p = 0.13, two-tailed).  While one 
might have anticipated that audit firms retain clients with high abnormal fees regardless 
of their risk, it is interesting to note that the audit firms failed to realize the risk in the 
missed clients and as such did not charge them a risk premium.  
Next, I add HIGH_EM to Model 1.  Model 2 is significant (p < 0.01) with a 
pseudo R2 of 33.43%.  HIGH_EM is positive, but not significant at any conventional 
level.  All other variables are consistent with the results reported in Model 1, except for 




In Model 3, I add HIGH_PROB_LIT to Model 1.  The overall model is significant 
(p < 0.01) and the pseudo R2 is 48.35%.  The new variable HIGH_PROB_LIT is negative 
and significant (p < 0.05) indicating that companies that are missed have a lower 
probability of litigation than those who are dismissed.  Additionally, this reduced sample 
yields two other factors which are significantly associated with companies being missed.  
Specifically, missed companies are younger (p < 0.05) and more likely to have turnover 
among top management (p < 0.05).   All other variables are consistent with the results 
reported in Model 1, except for ABN_AUDITFEES and GC which are no longer 
significant at the 10% level and IC_DEF which is now significant at the 10% level.  
Finally, I add both HIGH_EM and HIGH_PROB_LIT to Model 1.  Model 4 is 
significant (p < 0.01) and has a pseudo R2 of 58.80%, which is higher than any other 
model.32  Results from this model are consistent with those previously reported with the 
exception of AC_IND, NONAUDITFEES and PROB_RESTATE, which are now 
significant at the 10% level. 
Overall, the results from this analysis consistently indicate that missed firms are 
larger, less likely to have an internal control deficiency and have a lower probability of 
litigation than dismissed firms.  It is interesting to note that missed firms exhibit many of 
the same characteristics of dismissed firms.  Specifically, they are not significantly more 
distressed nor are they significantly more likely to have a loss than firms who are 
dismissed.  Additionally, missed firms have a similar level of leverage and earnings 
                                                 
32 Given the large increase in R2 from model 1 to 4, I rerun model 1 on the reduced sample in model 4 to 
determine if the increase in R2 is related to the inclusion of the probability of litigation variable or due to 
sample specific considerations.  When I rerun model 1 on the reduced sample the R2 increases from 30% to 
44%. This indicates that half the increase in the R2 from model 1 to model 4 is related to sample specific 




management as dismissed firms.  This appears to indicate that audit firms are keeping 
large clients that they would not keep if it weren’t for the company’s size.  This seems to 
indicate that certain larger clients are very important to specific partners or offices and 
they are able to convince the reviewing partners to a keep a client that otherwise they 
would dismiss.  While only speculation, it could be these clients provide a significant 
amount of fees to a particular partner or office or that these clients allows an office or 
firm to be classified as industry expert.  I leave this question for future research.  Based 
on the results discussed above, audit firms could reduce their litigation exposure by 
examining their existing clients looking for clients that exhibit financial and governance 
characteristics which are similar to those of the companies they dismiss. 
Conclusion 
 The post-SOX era has ushered in unprecedented change in the audit profession.  
While the existing literature provides us some insight on how audit firms make client 
acceptance/continuance decisions, almost all this literature predates SOX.  I extend this 
literature by investigating how audit firms make client continuance decisions in the post-
SOX era, whether these decisions are effective at identifying better clients, and why audit 
firms retain some risky clients while dismissing others. 
  Specifically, my findings indicate that the client continuance process is much 
more formal and rigorous post-SOX.  Audit partners cited an increase in the required 
documentation and the level of review as the key drivers of this change.  Additionally, it 




deciding to make a client continuance decision, even though the processes at the firms are 
slightly different.     
 Additionally, I find that clients who are retained by their audit firms have better 
subsequent financial performance than those clients who are not retained.  Finally, I find 
that audit firms appear to overweight client size when making the client continuance 
decision.  Specifically, it appears audit firms retain large clients who have risk profiles 
consistent with smaller clients they dismiss.  Future research should further examine the 
influence of these larger clients on their respective audit partner, office and/or firm.  
A limitation of this study is its use of proxies for factors/characteristics identified 
during the interview process.  The proxies I use in this paper to measure many of the 
factors/characteristics are not perfect.  I have taken care to select the best possible 
proxies; however, it is possible that the proxies used in this paper may measure the 
underlying factors/characteristics they represent with error.  Additionally, it is important 
to realize that during my examination of “risky” clients, I only examine one type of 
“risky” client, restatement companies.  While I believe that restatement companies are 
one of if not the most important type of “risky” clients, it is possible that examination of 
other types of “risky” clients could lead to different conclusions. 
Subject to the limitations discussed above, the results of this study help to further 
develop our understanding of how audit firms make client continuance decisions in the 
post-SOX era.  Additionally, this study provides evidence that audit firms retain better 
performing clients.  Finally, I provide audit firms with client factors that may allow the 
audit firms to better identify risky clients.  The results of this study should be of interest 
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Appendix A: Interview Protocol 
 
Introduction:  The period post-SOX has seen a dramatic rise in the number of auditor changes.  In 
my study, I am attempting to understand the auditor continuance decision in the 
post-SOX environment from the professional’s perspective.  To accomplish this 
goal, I have a series of questions to help me better understand how you/your firm 
evaluate clients. 
 
1. What is the process at your firm for evaluating client continuance?  Who performs the 
initial evaluation and what approvals are needed? 
 
2. Can you walk me through the factors/characteristics you/your firm find important when 
deciding whether or not to continue servicing a client? 
 
3. Specifically, what are the indicators that you may not want to continue servicing a client?  
How are these indicators observable in publicly available information? 
 
4. Of the factors/characteristics noted in questions #1 and #2, could you identify which 
items are most important to the decision to stop servicing a client?   
 
After allowing the interviewee to expound on the questions above, I will ask the 
interviewee about the role of the client/auditor characteristics below, which were not 
already identified by the interviewee, as being important to the client continuance 
decision. 
 
- Client characteristics 




o Stock volatility 
• Internal control 
• Management integrity 
• Audit committee 
• Other corporate governance characteristics 
• Litigation risk  
 
- Auditor characteristics 
• Profitability of engagement  
• Availability of appropriate personnel  






Appendix A (Continued) 
 
5. Finally, could you rate the importance of the items you identified as being important to 
the client continuance process?  At this time I will provide them a document with a Likert 
scale and ask them to rank the items we discussed plus any items they identified. 
 
6. How has SOX/Andersen impacted client continuance decisions? 
 
7. When making the client continuance decision what type of risk concerns you/your firm 
the most? 
 
- Possible answers 
• restatement 
• bankruptcy 
• stock volatility 
• litigation risk 
• fraud 
 
8. How does the client acceptance process differ from the client continuance process?   
 
9. What is (are) the primary industry(ies) you service.  Additionally, have you been the lead 
or concurring partner on any clients who the firm has resigned from in the past three 
years?  If so approximately how many? 
 
10. In addition to large increase in resignations in the past few years, there has been a large 
increase in the number of auditor dismissals.  Are these quasi-resignations or were these 





Appendix B: Likert Scale 
 
  Very  Moderately Of Little  
  Important Important Important Importance Unimportant 
Client Characteristics      
       
 Financial health of company 1 2 3 4 5 
       
 Profitability of company 1 2 3 4 5 
       
 Complexity of company 1 2 3 4 5 
       
 Rapid growth or downsizing of business 1 2 3 4 5 
       
 Stock volatility 1 2 3 4 5 
       
 Quality of internal controls 1 2 3 4 5 
       
 Management integrity 1 2 3 4 5 
       
 Management competence 1 2 3 4 5 
       
 Management tone toward financial reporting 1 2 3 4 5 
       
 Acct/Finance department competence 1 2 3 4 5 
       
 Audit committee competence 1 2 3 4 5 
       
 Audit committee financial expertise 1 2 3 4 5 
       
 Significant related party transactions 1 2 3 4 5 
       
 Prior restatement 1 2 3 4 5 
       
       
Auditor Characteristics      
       
 Profitability of engagement  1 2 3 4 5 
       
 Availability of appropriate personnel  1 2 3 4 5 
       





TABLE 1: Likert Scale - Characteristic Rankings 
 
     Rating Scale Frequencies   
 Very  Moderately Of Little    
 Important Important Important Importance Unimportant  Mean 
 1 2 3 4 5  Ranking 
        Client Characteristics        
             Management integrity 10 0 0 0 0  1.00 
     Management tone toward financial reporting 9 1 0 0 0  1.10 
     Management competence 7 3 0 0 0  1.30 
     Quality of internal controls 5 5 0 0 0  1.50 
     Accounting and Finance Dept competence 5 5 0 0 0  1.50 
     Financial health of company 5 4 1 0 0  1.60 
     Audit committee competence 5 4 1 0 0  1.60 
     Audit committee financial expertise 2 7 1 0 0  1.90 
     Complexity of company 3 4 3 0 0  2.00 
     Prior restatement 4 2 3 1 0  2.10 
     Significant related party transactions 1 5 4 0 0  2.30 
     Profitability of company 1 5 3 1 0  2.40 
     Rapid growth or downsizing of business 1 4 5 0 0  2.40 
     Stock volatility 0 5 3 2 0  2.70 
        Auditor Characteristics        
             Availability of appropriate personnel  7 2 1 0 0  1.40 
     Industry expertise of office/personnel 5 5 0 0 0  1.50 
     Profitability of engagement  0 7 3 0 0  2.30 






TABLE 2: Descriptive Statistics – Client Retention Sample a 
Mean (Median) [Std. Dev.] 
 
         
  Predicted  Resignation  Retained  (Resignation - 
Variable b  Sign  Sample  Sample  Retained) c 
            IC_DEF  +  0.170   0.070   0.100 *** 
    (0.000)   (0.000)   0.000 *** 
    [0.377]   [0.256]     
            NEW  +  0.570   0.610   -0.040  
    (1.000)   (1.000)   0.000  
    [0.496]   [0.489]     
            NEG_CF  +  0.460   0.440   -0.020  
    (0.000)   (0.000)   0.000  
    [0.500]   [0.498]     
            DISTRESS  +  0.115   0.096   0.019  
    (0.000)   (0.000)   0.000  
    [0.276]   [0.239]     
            GC  +  0.220   0.065   0.155 *** 
    (0.000)   (0.000)   0.000 *** 
    [0.415]   [0.247]     
            LEVERAGE  +  0.851   0.633   0.218 ** 
    (0.616)   (0.581)   0.035  
    [1.545]   [0.485]     
            LOSS  +  0.630   0.625   -0.003  
    (1.000)   (1.000)   0.000  
    [0.484]   [0.485]     
            RESTATE  +  0.200   0.075   0.125 *** 
    (0.000)   (0.000)   0.000 *** 
    [0.401]   [0.264]     
            RELATED_PARTY  +  2.780   2.950   -0.170  
    (2.000)   (2.000)   0.000  
    [3.072]   [3.969]     




TABLE 2 (continued) 
 
         
  Predicted  Resignation  Retained  (Resignation - 
Variable b  Sign  Sample  Sample  Retained) c 
            AUDIT_LAG  +  75.825   58.625   17.200 *** 
    (74.500)   (60.000)   14.500 *** 
    [33.927]   [22.618]     
            AC_IND  -  0.860   0.835   0.025  
    (1.000)   (1.000)   0.000  
    [0.348]   [0.372]     
            AC_MEET  +  0.110   0.100   0.010  
    (0.000)   (0.000)   0.000  
    [0.314]   [0.301]     
            FE  -  0.755   0.815   -0.060 * 
    (1.000)   (1.000)   0.000 * 
    [0.431]   [0.389]     
            ABN_AUDITFEES  -  0.129   0.312   -0.241 * 
    (0.000)   (-0.017)   -0.113  
    [0.593]   [1.717]     
            NONAUDITFEES  -  0.222   0.518   -0.296 *** 
    (0.063)   (0.119)   -0.056 *** 
    [0.706]   [1.820]     
         SIZE  -  666.456   4,283.070   -3,616.61 *** 
    (66.292)   (142.213)   -75.921 *** 
    [2,731.881]   [23,334.410]     
            HIGH_EM  +  0.394   0.328   0.066 * 
    (0.000)   (0.000)   0.000 * 
    [0.490]   [0.471]     
         HIGH_PROB_LIT  +  0.433   0.404   0.029  
    (0.000)   (0.000)   0.000  
    [0.497]   [0.492]     
          
*, ** and *** indicate significance at p <  0.10, p <  0.05 and p <  0.01, respectively, 





TABLE 2 (continued) 
 
a The sample consists of 400 observations (200 matched pairs) for each of the variables except 
HIGH_EM and HIGH_PROB_LIT which have 360 observations (180 matched pairs) and 282 
observations (141 matched pairs), respectively.  
 











1 if any of the disclosed members of management was new to 











the probability of bankruptcy calculated using Zmijewski’s 
(1984) financial distress score; 
GC  = 1 if the company received a going-concern opinion, 0 otherwise; 
LEVERAGE   = the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 





1 if the company restated their financial statements in the year 
prior to the resignation, 0 otherwise; 





the number of calendar days from the fiscal year-end to the date 





1 if the audit committee is 100 percent independent, 0 
otherwise; 







1 if at least one member of the audit committee is disclosed by 
the company as a financial expert or has experience as a CFO, 
Accountant, VP of Finance, CPA, or Controller, 0 otherwise; 
ABN_AUDITFEES  = unexpected audit fees in millions of dollars; 
NONAUDITFEES  = non-audit fees in millions of dollars; 









1 if the decile of the company’s absolute value of performance 
adjusted discretionary accruals from the modified Jones model 






1 if the probability of litigation calculated using Stice (1991) 
litigation score is greater than 0.50, 0 otherwise; 
 
c Tests for differences in the means are based on t-statistics (z-statistics) for continuous 
(dichotomous) variables. Nonparametric tests for differences in location are based on the 




TABLE 3: Correlation Matrix – Client Retention Sample a 
 
             
Variable b  IC_DEF  NEW  NEG_CF  DISTRESS  GC  LEVERAGE 
                   NEW  -0.0050                 
                   NEG_CF  -0.0250   0.1610 ***             
                   DISTRESS  -0.0110   0.0925 *  0.2270 ***          
                   GC  -0.0185   0.0635   0.2490 ***  0.3594 ***       
                   LEVERAGE  0.0861 *  0.0796   -0.1460 ***  0.4140 ***  0.1868 ***    
                   LOSS  -0.0178   0.2514 ***  0.5410 ***  0.3926 ***  0.2549 ***  -0.0040  
                   RESTATE  0.3217 ***  -0.0214   -0.0400   0.0698   0.0864 *  0.0835 * 
                   RELATED_PARTY  -0.0033   0.1821 ***  0.0510   0.2287 ***  0.1806 ***  0.0594  
                   AUDIT_LAG  0.2976 ***  0.0919 ***  0.1520 ***  0.1179 **  0.2607 ***  0.0758  
                   AC_IND  0.0496   0.0140   -0.0920 *  -0.0152   -0.1056 **  0.0202  
                   AC_MEET  -0.0763   -0.0793   0.0510   0.0269   0.0937 *  -0.0026  
                   FE  0.1184 **  0.0215   -0.0400   -0.1372 ***  -0.1871 ***  -0.1065 ** 
                   ABN_AUDITFEES  0.3291 ***  0.1114 **  0.0200   -0.0332   0.0074   0.0506  
                   NONAUDITFEES  0.0493   -0.0098   -0.2350 ***  -0.1232 **  -0.2448 ***  -0.0027  
                   SIZE  0.1136 **  -0.0843 *  -0.4450 ***  -0.2859 ***  -0.4193 ***  -0.0924 * 
             HIGH_EM  -0.0210   0.1612 ***  0.4150 ***  0.1969 ***  0.1791 ***  0.2589 *** 
                   HIGH_PROB_LIT  -0.1108 *  0.1862 ***  0.3300 ***  0.3768 ***  0.2977 ***  0.0963  





TABLE 3 (Continued) 
 
Variable b  LOSS  RESTATE  RELATED_PARTY  AUDIT_LAG  AC_IND  AC_MEET  
                    LOSS                    
                    RESTATE  0.0073                  
                    RELATED_PARTY  0.0638   0.0486               
                    AUDIT_LAG  0.1690 ***  0.2434 ***  0.0800            
                    AC_IND  -0.0392   -0.0124   -0.1423 ***  0.0446         
                    AC_MEET  0.0109   -0.0657   -0.0080   0.0334   -0.1950 ***     
                    FE  -0.0634   -0.0208   -0.0951 *  0.0032   0.1843 ***  -0.0788   
                    ABN_AUDITFEES  0.0030   0.1730 ***  0.0528   0.2630 ***  0.0369   -0.0476   
                    NONAUDITFEES  -0.2047 ***  0.1243 **  0.0031   -0.1420 ***  0.0686   0.2278 ***  
                    SIZE  -0.4058 ***  0.1269 **  0.0775   -0.1881 ***  0.1037 **  -0.1899 ***  
                    HIGH_EM  0.2786 ***  -0.0177   0.0683   0.1212 **  -0.0362   0.0543   
                    HIGH_PROB_LIT  0.5484 ***  -0.0066   0.1826 ***  0.1456 **  -0.0962   -0.0729   




TABLE 3 (Continued) 
 
Variable b  FE  ABN_AUDITFEES  NONAUDITFEES  SIZE  HIGH_EM 
                FE                
                ABN_AUDITFEES  0.0748              
                NONAUDITFEES  0.0251   0.1626 ***          
                SIZE  0.0574   0.0000   0.4624 ***       
                HIGH_EM  -0.0519   0.0255   -0.1923 ***  -0.3094 ***    
                HIGH_PROB_LIT  -0.1807 ***  0.0687   -0.1526 **  -0.4423 ***  0.2995 *** 
                 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at p <  0.10, p <  0.05 and p <  0.01, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
 
a I report Spearman rank correlation coefficients for IC_DEF, NEW, NEG_CF, GC, LOSS, RESTATE, AUDIT_LAG, 
AC_MEET, FE, HIGH_EM, LOSS and HIGH_PROB_LIT and Pearson correlations otherwise. 
 







TABLE 4: Matched-Pairs Logistic Regression Analysis – Client Retention Sample 
 
RESIGN a = b0 + b1IC_DEF + b2NEW + b3NEG_CF + b4DISTRESS + b5GC + 
b6LEVERAGE + b7LOSS + b8RESTATE + b9RELATED_PARTY + 
b10AUDIT_LAG + b11AC_IND + b12AC_MEET + b13FE + 
b14ABN_AUDITFEES + b15NONAUDITFEES + b16SIZE + 
b17HIGH_EM + b18HIGH_PROB_LIT + e 
 
           
Variable b 
 Predicted 
Sign  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
               IC_DEF  +  1.1088 **  0.8720 *  1.5792 ***  1.6352 ** 
NEW  +  -0.0438   0.1590   -0.0244   0.2817  
NEG_CF  +  0.0185   -0.0044   -0.5457   -0.5714  
DISTRESS  +  -0.4800   -0.6042   -0.9862   -0.4495  
GC  +  1.8995 ***  2.3707 ***  2.3143 **  2.6087 ** 
LEVERAGE  +  0.7583 **  0.6982 **  0.7812 *  0.7433 * 
LOSS  +  0.3965   0.1824   0.6216   0.7017  
RESTATE  +  0.7714 *  0.6514 *  1.1619 **  0.9510 * 
RELATED_PARTY  +  -0.0033   0.0432   -0.0183   -0.0054  
AUDIT_LAG  +  1.2550 ***  1.3730 ***  1.0904 **  1.2490 *** 
AC_IND  -  0.0578   0.1335   0.2147   0.5047  
AC_MEET  +  -0.5884   -0.6769   -1.1180   -1.0479  
FE  -  -0.1758   -0.0048   -0.4476   -0.1592  
ABN_AUDITFEES  -  -0.0884   0.0908   -0.2922   -0.1716  
NONAUDITFEES   -  -0.0985 **  -0.0933 **  -0.0019   0.0249  
SIZE  -  -0.3250 ***  -0.3098 ***  -0.4913 ***  -0.4723 *** 
HIGH_EM  +     0.4839 *     1.1778 ** 
HIGH_PROB_LIT  +        -0.6018   -0.4589  
               
N    400   360   282   254  
χ2    99.14   94.37   72.97   70.68  
p-value    0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
Pseudo R2    35.76%   37.82%   37.33%   40.15%  




TABLE 4 (Continued 
 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at p <  0.10, p <  0.05 and p <  0.01, respectively, 
based on one-tailed tests. 
 
a The dependent variable for this analysis is RESIGN, which equals 1 if the audit firm 
resigned from the engagement and 0 otherwise. 
 
b All variables are defined in Table 2.  For the regression analyses, AUDIT_LAG, 




TABLE 5: Descriptive Statistics – First Year After 
Mean (Median) [Std. Dev.] 
  
Panel A – Full Sample a 
 
  Resignation  Retained  (Resignation - 
Variable c  Sample  Sample  Retained) d 
          
SIZE_AFTER  599.696   7,223.424   -6,623.728 *** 
  (46.260)   (484.694)   -438.434 *** 
  [2,578.586]   [51,093.020]     
          ROA_AFTER  -0.889   -0.053   -0.836 *** 
  (-0.072)   (0.031)   -0.103 *** 
  [9.694]   [1.380]     
          DISTRESS_AFTER  0.185   0.052   0.133 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   0.000 *** 
  [0.355]   [0.181]     
          DELIST_AFTER  0.045   0.007   0.038 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   0.000 *** 
  [0.207]   [0.084]     
          RESTATE_AFTER  0.166   0.082   0.084 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   0.000 *** 
  [0.373]   [0.275]     
          GC_AFTER  0.221   0.040   0.180 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   0.000 *** 
  [0.415]   [0.197]     
          LOSS_AFTER  0.625   0.315   0.310 *** 
  (1.000)   (0.000)   1.000 *** 
  [0.485]   [0.465]     
          IC_DEF_AFTER  0.203   0.073   0.130 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   0.000 *** 
  [0.403]   [0.261]     
          EM_AFTER  6.229   4.973   1.256 *** 
  (7.000)   (5.000)   2.000 *** 
  [2.779]   [2.705]     
          PROB_LIT_AFTER  0.381   0.180   0.202 *** 
  (0.060)   (0.003)   0.057 *** 
  [0.444]   [0.340]     




TABLE 5 (Continued) 
 
Panel B – Matched Sample b 
 
  Resignation  Retained  (Resignation - 
Variable c  Sample  Sample  Retained) d 
          SIZE_AFTER  696.808   4,461.065   -3,764.257 ** 
  (64.436)   (154.925)   -90.489 *** 
  [2,762.693]   [26,255.800]     
          ROA_AFTER  -0.326   -0.181   -0.145  
  (-0.071)   (-0.005)   -0.065 *** 
  [1.281]   [0.706]     
          DISTRESS_AFTER  0.141   0.074   0.066 ** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   0.000 *** 
  [0.307]   [0.204]     
          DELIST_AFTER  0.050   0.025   0.025  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   0.000  
  [0.218]   [0.157]     
          RESTATE_AFTER  0.170   0.080   0.090 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   0.000 *** 
  [0.377]   [0.272]     
          GC_AFTER  0.205   0.060   0.145 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   0.000 *** 
  [0.405]   [0.238]     
          LOSS_AFTER  0.620   0.520   0.100 ** 
  (1.000)   (1.000)   0.000 ** 
  [0.487]   [0.501]     
          IC_DEF_AFTER  0.205   0.080   0.125 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   0.000 *** 
  [0.405]   [0.272]     
          EM_AFTER  6.077   5.514   0.563 * 
  (7.000)   (6.000)   1.000 * 
  [2.808]   [2.926]     
          PROB_LIT_AFTER  0.340   0.269   0.071  
  (0.021)   (0.014)   0.007  
  [0.434]   [0.385]     




TABLE 5 (Continued) 
 
 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at p <  0.10, p <  0.05 and p <  0.01, respectively, 
based on two-tailed tests. 
 
c The sample size for the full sample ranges from a low of 10,247 observations for 
PROB_LIT_AFTER to a high of 15,895 for SIZE_AFTER. 
 
c The sample consists of 400 observations (200 matched pairs) for each of the variables except 
EM_AFTER and PROB_LIT_AFTER which have 366 observations (183 matched pairs) and 266 
observations (133 matched pairs), respectively. 
 
c Variable definitions: 
 
SIZE_AFTER  = assets in millions of dollars; 





the probability of bankruptcy calculated using Zmijewski’s 











1 if company restated their financial statements in the year 





1 if company received a GC opinion in the year after the 
resignation; 













the decile of the company’s absolute value of performance 
adjusted discretionary accruals from the modified Jones 





the probability of litigation calculated using Stice’s (1991) 
litigation score. 
 
d Tests for differences in the means are based on t-statistics (z-statistics) for continuous 
(dichotomous) variables. Nonparametric tests for differences in location are based on the 





TABLE 6: Correlation Matrix - First Year After a 
 
Variable b  SIZE_AFTER  ROA_AFTER  DISTRESS_AFTER  DELIST_AFTER c  RESTATE_AFTER 
                ROA_AFTER  0.2875 ***             
                DISTRESS_AFTER  -0.3569 ***  -0.4237 ***          
                DELIST_AFTER  -0.1613 ***  -0.1509 ***  0.1013 **       
                RESTATE_AFTER  -0.0638   0.0683   0.0864 *  -0.0348     
                GC_AFTER  -0.4281 ***  -0.4319 ***  0.4163 ***  0.1946 ***  0.1198 ** 
                LOSS_AFTER  -0.4301 ***  -0.8531 ***  0.3970 ***  0.1449 ***  0.0229  
                IC_DEF_AFTER  0.0285   -0.0566   -0.0075   0.0325   0.1919 *** 
                PROB_LIT_AFTER c  -0.3116 ***  -0.3296 ***  0.2805 ***     0.0844  
                EM_AFTER  -0.3652 ***  -0.2615 ***  0.2909 ***  0.1210 **  -0.0297  





TABLE 6 (Continued) 
 
Variable b  GC_AFTER  LOSS_AFTER  IC_DEF_AFTER  PROB_LIT_AFTER 
             LOSS_AFTER  0.3246 ***          
             IC_DEF_AFTER  0.0938 *  0.0652        
             PROB_LIT_AFTER  0.3097 ***  0.4188 ***  0.0457     
             EM_AFTER  0.2911 ***  0.3128 ***  -0.0160   0.2059 *** 
              
*, ** and *** indicate significance at p <  0.10, p <  0.05 and p <  0.01, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
 
a I report Spearman rank correlation coefficients for DELIST_AFTER, RESTATE_AFTER, GC_AFTER, LOSS_AFTER and 
IC_DEF_AFTER and Pearson correlations otherwise. 
 
b All variables are defined in Table 5. 
 
c There is not a correlation coefficient between PROB_LIT_AFTER and DELIST_AFTER because there are no sample items 









TABLE 7: Matched-Pairs Logistic Regression Analysis – First Year After 
 
RETAIN a = b0 + b1SIZE_AFTER + b2ROA_AFTER + b3DISTRESS_AFTER + 
b4DELIST_AFTER + b5RESTATE_AFTER + b6GC_AFTER + 
b7LOSS_AFTER + b8IC_DEF_AFTER + b9EM_AFTER + 
b10PROB_LIT_AFTER + e 
 
Variable b  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 c  Model 4 c 
             
SIZE_AFTER  0.4034 ***  0.4305 ***  0.4128 ***  0.4226 *** 
ROA_AFTER  0.0208   -0.0337   -0.2987   -0.6324  
DISTRESS_AFTER  -0.3912   -0.5444   0.8591   0.2740  
DELIST_AFTER  0.0126   0.2296        
RESTATE_AFTER  -0.3962   -0.3818   -0.2772   -0.3594  
GC_AFTER  -1.1968 **  -1.4498 **  -1.1462   -0.9175  
LOSS_AFTER  -0.3825   -0.5204   -0.2801   -0.5939  
IC_DEF_AFTER  -1.1756 ***  -0.9754 **  -1.6506 ***  -1.9230 *** 
EM_AFTER     -0.0545      -0.0739  
PROB_LIT_AFTER        -0.2926   -0.2195  
             
N  400   366   266   244  
χ2  74.79   76.85   48.36   49.99  
p-value  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
Pseudo R2  26.97%   30.29%   26.23%   29.56%  
              
** and *** indicate significance at p <  0.05 and p <  0.01, respectively, based on two-
tailed tests. 
 
a The dependent variable for this analysis is RETAIN, which equals 1 if the company is 
retained by the audit firm and 0 otherwise. 
 
b All variables are defined in Table 5.  For the regression analyses, SIZE_AFTER is 
transformed using the natural log. 
 
c DELIST_AFTER is dropped from these models because there are no sample items with 






TABLE 8: Descriptive Statistics - Two Years After 
Mean (Median) [Std. Dev.] 
 
Panel A – Full Sample 
 
  Resignation  Retained  (Resignation - 
Variable a  Sample  Sample  Retained) b 
          SIZE_AVG  529.435   7,277.123   -6,747.688 *** 
  (49.490)   (486.847)   -2.643 *** 
  [2,219.654]   [51,253.540]     
          ROA_AVG  -1.218   -0.085   -1.133 *** 
  (-0.046)   (0.032)   -0.013 *** 
  [9.331]   [3.788]     
          DISTRESS_AVG  0.185   0.049   0.136 *** 
  (0.001)   (0.000)   0.001 *** 
  [0.338]   [0.161]     
          DELIST_AVG  0.089   0.016   0.073 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   0.000 *** 
  [0.286]   [0.126]     
          RESTATE_AVG  0.285   0.164   0.121 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   0.000 *** 
  [0.452]   [0.370]     
          GC_AVG  0.266   0.047   0.218 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   0.000 *** 
  [0.442]   [0.213]     
          LOSS_AVG  0.643   0.361   0.282 *** 
  (1.000)   (0.000)   1.000 *** 
  [0.480]   [0.480]     
          IC_DEF_AVG  0.266   0.126   0.139 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   0.000 *** 
  [0.442]   [0.332]     
          EM_AVG  6.276   4.944   1.332 *** 
  (6.500)   (5.000)   1.500 *** 
  [2.333]   [2.159]     
          PROB_LIT_AVG  0.339   0.172   0.167 *** 
  (0.200)   (0.007)   0.193 *** 
  [0.374]   [0.295]     




TABLE 8 (Continued) 
 
Panel B – Matched Sample 
 
  Resignation  Retained  (Resignation - 
Variable a  Sample  Sample  Retained) b 
          SIZE_AVG  630.051   4,045.364   -3,415.313 ** 
  (69.476)   (181.564)   -112.088 *** 
  [2,663.994]   [14,804.260]     
          ROA_AVG  -0.526   -0.152   -0.375 * 
  (-0.062)   (-0.009)   -0.053  
  [1.842]   [0.490]     
          DISTRESS_AVG  0.137   0.057   0.080 ** 
  (0.001)   (0.000)   0.001 *** 
  [0.290]   [0.153]     
          DELIST_AVG  0.093   0.021   0.072 ** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   0.000 ** 
  [0.292]   [0.143]     
          RESTATE_AVG  0.330   0.165   0.165 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   0.000 *** 
  [0.473]   [0.373]     
          GC_AVG  0.278   0.031   0.247 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   0.000 *** 
  [0.451]   [0.174]     
          LOSS_AVG  0.711   0.619   0.093  
  (1.000)   (1.000)   0.000  
  [0.455]   [0.488]     
          IC_DEF_AVG  0.309   0.072   0.237 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   0.000 *** 
  [0.465]   [0.260]     
          EM_AVG  6.313   5.364   0.949 *** 
  (6.500)   (5.500)   1.000 *** 
  [2.092]   [2.192]     
          PROB_LIT_AVG  0.364   0.261   0.103  
  (0.201)   (0.016)   0.185  
  [0.397]   [0.378]     




TABLE 8 (Continued) 
 
 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at p <  0.10, p <  0.05 and p <  0.01, respectively, 
based on two-tailed tests. 
 
a The sample size for the full sample ranges from a low of 6,728 observations for 
PROB_LIT_AVG to a high of 10,521 for SIZE_AVG. 
 
b The sample consists of 194 observations (97 matched pairs) for each of the variables except 
EM_AVG and PROB_LIT_AVG which have 176 observations (88 matched pairs) and 124 
observations (62 matched pairs), respectively. 
 






the average of assets for the first two years after resignation 













the average probability of bankruptcy calculated using 
Zmijewski’s (1984) financial distress score assets for the 





1 if company delisted in the either of the first two years after 





1 if company restated their financial statements in either of 





1 if company received a GC opinion in either of the first two 





1 if the company reports negative income in either of the 





1 if the company reports a deficiency in its internal controls 









the average decile of the company’s absolute value of 
performance adjusted discretionary accruals from the 
modified Jones model as compared to all firms on 







the average probability of litigation calculated using Stice’s 
(1991) litigation score for the first two years after 
resignation. 
 
d Tests for differences in the means are based on t-statistics (z-statistics) for continuous 
(dichotomous) variables. Nonparametric tests for differences in location are based on the 




TABLE 9: Correlation Matrix – Two Years After a 
 
Variable b  SIZE_AVG  ROA_AVG  DISTRESS_AVG  DELIST_AVG  RESTATE_AVG 
                ROA_AVG  0.3758 ***             
                DISTRESS_AVG  -0.3705 ***  -0.6064 ***          
                DELIST_AVG  -0.1471 **  -0.0585   0.0028        
                RESTATE_AVG  -0.0995   -0.1462 **  0.1678 ***  0.0328     
                GC_AVG  -0.4469 ***  -0.3741 ***  0.4462 ***  0.1948 ***  0.1349 *** 
                LOSS_AVG  -0.4407 ***  -0.7652 ***  0.3528 ***  0.1189 **  0.0684  
                IC_DEF_AVG  0.0264   -0.0678   0.0316   0.0608   0.3175 *** 
                EM_AVG  -0.5014 ***  -0.3434 ***  0.3288 ***  0.0131   0.0533  
                PROB_LIT_AVG  -0.4500 ***  -0.4697 ***  0.2698 ***  0.0668   0.0871  





TABLE 9 (Continued) 
 
Variable b  GC_AVG  LOSS_AVG  IC_DEF_AVG  EM_AVG 
             LOSS_AVG  0.3416 ***          
             IC_DEF_AVG  0.1178 **  0.1134 **       
             EM_AVG  0.4240 ***  0.3011 ***  -0.1478 **    
             PROB_LIT_AVG  0.3690 ***  0.5252 ***  0.1145   0.3715 *** 
              
** and *** indicate significance at p <  0.05 and p <  0.01, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
 
a I report Spearman rank correlation coefficients for DELIST_AVG, RESTATE_AVG, GC_AVG, LOSS_AVG and 
IC_DEF_AVG and Pearson correlations otherwise. 
 








TABLE 10: Matched-Pairs Logistic Regression Analysis – Two Years After 
 
RETAIN a  = b0 + b1SIZE_AVG + b2ROA_AVG + b3DISTRESS_AVG + 
b4DELIST_AVG + b5RESTATE_AVG + b6GC_AVG + b7LOSS_AVG 
+ b8IC_DEF_AVG + b9EM_AVG + b10PROB_LIT_AVG + e 
 
Variable b  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
             
SIZE_AVG  0.5774 ***  0.5007 ***  0.6329 ***  0.6153 ** 
ROA_AVG  0.9997   0.4875   0.7523   -1.3118  
DISTRESS_AVG  -2.4722   -3.3188 *  -2.0487   -4.3837  
DELIST_AVG  -2.2215   -2.4764 *  -21.6324   -20.0722  
RESTATE_AVG  -0.4814   -0.6334   0.3851   -0.0172  
GC_AVG  -4.3313 **  -4.8079 **  -16.6422   -15.2059  
LOSS_AVG  0.6132   -0.3517   0.8992   -1.0835  
IC_DEF_AVG  -2.5657 ***  -2.5066 ***  -3.6902 ***  -3.7959 *** 
EM_AVG     -0.2171      -0.2715  
PROB_LIT_AVG        -1.1347   -0.2475  
             
N  194   176   124   110  
χ2  74.74   70.39   45.96   44.37  
p-value  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
Pseudo R2  55.58%   57.70%   53.47%   58.19%  
              
*, ** and *** indicate significance at p <  0.10, p <  0.05 and p <  0.01, respectively, 
based on two-tailed tests. 
 
a The dependent variable for this analysis is RETAIN, which equals 1 if the company is 
retained by the audit firm and 0 otherwise. 
 
b All variables are defined in Table 8.  For the regression analyses, SIZE_AVG is 







TABLE 11: Descriptive Statistics – Risky Clients Sample a 
Mean (Median) [Std. Dev.] 
 
  Dismissed  Missed  (Dismissed - 
Variable b  Sample  Sample  Missed) c 
        IC_DEF  0.202  0.106  0.096 * 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  0.000 * 
  [0.403]  [0.309]    
        NEW  0.654  0.692  -0.038  
  (1.000)  (1.000)  0.000  
  [0.478]  [0.464]    
        NEG_CF  0.510  0.452  0.058  
  (1.000)  (0.000)  0.000  
  [0.502]  [0.500]    
        DISTRESS  0.184  0.100  0.083 ** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  -0.000  
  [0.347]  [0.236]    
        GC  0.240  0.077  0.163 *** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  0.000 *** 
  [0.429]  [0.268]    
        LEVERAGE  9.342  0.599  8.743  
  (0.623)  (0.569)  0.055  
  [88.251]  [0.428]    
        LOSS  0.673  0.653  0.020  
  (1.000)  (1.000)  0.000  
  [0.471]  [0.478]    
        RELATED_PARTY  2.913  2.971  -0.058  
  (2.000)  (2.000)  0.000  
  [3.113]  [3.437]    
        AUDIT_LAG  77.135  68.038  9.097 ** 
  (75.000)  (70.000)  -5.000 ** 
  [35.090]  [25.737]    
        AC_IND  0.808  0.846  -0.038  
  (1.000)  (1.000)  0.000  
  [0.396]  [0.363]    




TABLE 11 (Continued) 
 
  Dismissed  Missed  (Dismissed - 
Variable b  Sample  Sample  Missed) c 
        AC_MEET  0.115  0.087  0.029  
  (0.000)  (0.000)  0.000  
  [0.321]  [0.283]    
        FE  0.673  0.712  -0.038  
  (1.000)  (1.000)  0.000  
  [0.471]  [0.455]    
        ABN_AUDITFEES  0.148  0.383  -0.235  
  (0.008)  (-0.015)  0.023  
  [0.827]  [0.569]    
        NONAUDITFEES  0.262  0.621  -0.359 ** 
  (0.076)  (0.121)  0.045 *** 
  [0.802]  [1.683]    
        SIZE  937.153  8,371.52  -7,434.370 * 
  (68.533)  (177.887)  109.354 *** 
  [3,191.237]  [59,751.420]    
        AGE  13.394  13.721  -0.327  
  (9.000)  (10.000)  -1.00  
  [10.325]  [11.412]    
        BLOCK  0.405  0.397  0.008  
  (0.387)  (0.386)  0.002  
  [0.266]  [0.257]    
        GROWTH  0.023  0.774  -0.750  
  (-0.036)  (-0.023)  -0.013  
  [0.482]  [6.395]    
        PROB_RESTATE  0.599  0.653  -0.053  
  (0.563)  (0.671)  -0.109  
  [0.372]  [0.326]    
        HIGH_EM  0.410  0.347  0.063  
  (0.000)  (0.000)  0.000  
  [0.494]  [0.478]    
        HIGH_PROB_LIT  0.510  0.397  0.117  
  (1.000)  (0.000)  1.000  
  [0.504]  [0.493]    




TABLE 11 (Continued) 
 
 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at p <  0.10, p <  0.05 and p <  0.01, respectively, 
based on two-tailed tests. 
 
a The sample consists of 208 observations (104 matched pairs) for each of the variables except 
HIGH_EM and HIGH_PROB_LIT which have 202 observations (101 matched pairs) and 126 
observations (63 matched pairs), respectively.  
 














the cumulative percentage of outstanding common stock 
shares held by 5 percent plus blockholders not affiliated with 
management (Compact D); 







the estimated probability of restatement at the resignation 
decision calculated using the model developed by Turner and 
Sennetti (2001). 
 
c Tests for differences in the means are based on t-statistics (z-statistics) for continuous 
(dichotomous) variables. Nonparametric tests for differences in location are based on the 





TABLE 12: Correlation Matrix – Risky Clients Sample a 
 
Variable b  IC_DEF  NEW  NEG_CF  DISTRESS  GC  LEVERAGE 
                   NEW  0.0983                 
                   NEG_CF  0.0700   0.0350              
                   DISTRESS  -0.1019   0.1147 *  0.2070 ***          
                   GC  -0.0028   0.0221   0.1880 ***  0.4448 ***       
                   LEVERAGE  0.0304   0.0500   -0.1270 *  0.2042 ***  0.2793 ***    
                   LOSS  -0.0347   0.0025   0.5220 ***  0.3062 ***  0.1979 ***  -0.0210  
                   RELATED_PARTY  -0.0567   0.0208   -0.0470   0.0807   0.0500   0.0446  
                   AUDIT_LAG  0.1760 **  0.1678 **  0.1610 **  0.1361 **  0.0843   -0.0148  
                   AC_IND  -0.0163   0.0063   -0.1190 *  -0.1219 *  -0.0100   -0.2178 *** 
                   LOW_AC_MEET  -0.0987   -0.0386   0.1570 **  0.2611 ***  0.2476 ***  0.1426 ** 
                   FE  0.2265 ***  0.0461   0.0160   -0.1202 *  0.0044   0.0618  
                   ABN_AUDITFEES  0.2506 ***  0.0819   0.1050   0.0221   0.0216   0.0002  
                   NONAUDITFEES  -0.0778   0.0183   -0.2130 ***  -0.1899 ***  -0.2340 ***  -0.0070  
                   SIZE  0.0737   0.0208   -0.5130 ***  -0.4271 ***  -0.4551 ***  -0.2979 *** 
                   AGE  -0.0020   -0.0208   -0.3670 ***  -0.2364 ***  -0.1956 ***  -0.0275  
                   BLOCK  -0.0913   -0.0465   -0.0690   -0.0116   0.0103   0.0447  
                   GROWTH  0.1303 *  -0.0993   -0.2810 ***  -0.0216   -0.2644 ***  -0.0096  
                   PROB_RESTATE  -0.0637   0.0244   0.3530 ***  -0.3071 ***  -0.0789   -0.1288 * 
                   HIGH_EM  -0.0454   -0.0119   0.3550 ***  0.2075 ***  0.2649 ***  -0.0079  
                   HIGH_PROB_LIT  -0.0642   -0.0184   0.4200 ***  0.3277 ***  0.3208 ***  0.0800  




TABLE 12 (Continued)  
 
Variable b  LOSS  RELATED_PARTY  AUDIT_LAG  AC_IND  AC_MEET 
                RELATED_PARTY  0.0364              
                AUDIT_LAG  0.1092   0.1645 **          
                AC_IND  -0.1107   -0.2374 ***  -0.0452        
                LOW_AC_MEET  0.2049 ***  0.1196 *  0.0078   -0.1841 ***    
                FE  0.0984   -0.0469   0.1418 **  0.1080   -0.2606 *** 
                ABN_AUDITFEES  0.0061   -0.0463   0.2158 ***  0.0698   -0.0921  
                NONAUDITFEES  -0.2214 ***  -0.0506   -0.0143   0.1678 **  -0.2539 *** 
                SIZE  -0.4512 ***  0.0023   -0.0762   0.1562 **  -0.3430 *** 
                AGE  -0.2463 ***  -0.0962   0.0177   0.1431 **  -0.2316 *** 
                BLOCK  0.0260   0.0733   0.0963   -0.0409   -0.0416  
                GROWTH  -0.4496 ***  -0.0025   0.0315   -0.0015   -0.1524 ** 
                PROB_RESTATE  0.4486 ***  -0.0165   0.0047   0.0942   -0.0378  
                HIGH_EM  0.2943 ***  0.0700   0.0243   -0.0057   0.0703  
                HIGH_PROB_LIT  0.4175 ***  0.0950   0.1333   0.1802 **  0.0963  





TABLE 12 (Continued)   
 
Variable b  FE  ABN_AUDITFEES  NONAUDITFEES  SIZE  AGE 
                ABN_AUDITFEES  0.1206 *             
                NONAUDITFEES  0.0120   0.1575 **          
                SIZE  0.1286 *  0.0000   0.3946 ***       
                AGE  0.1345 *  0.0618   0.2418 ***  0.4167 ***    
                BLOCK  0.0432   -0.0053   0.0596   -0.0477   0.1371 ** 
                GROWTH  0.1233 *  0.1405 **  -0.2219 ***  -0.0233   -0.1464 ** 
                PROB_RESTATE  -0.0746   -0.0648   0.0219   -0.1416 **  -0.1758 ** 
                HIGH_EM  0.0017   -0.0773   -0.1545 **  -0.3785 ***  -0.2301 *** 
                HIGH_PROB_LIT  -0.1691 *  0.0112   -0.2008 **  -0.4746 ***  -0.3224 *** 

















TABLE 12 (Continued) 
 
Variable b  BLOCK  GROWTH  PROB_RESTATE  HIGH_EM 
             GROWTH  -0.0976           
             PROB_RESTATE  -0.0669   -0.1310 *       
             HIGH_EM  0.0178   -0.1900 ***  0.2030 ***    
             HIGH_PROB_LIT  0.0651   -0.3255 ***  0.3314 ***  0.3134 *** 
              
*, ** and *** indicate significance at p <  0.10, p <  0.05 and p <  0.01, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
 
a I report Spearman rank correlation coefficients for IC_DEF, NEW, NEG_CF, GC, LOSS, AUDIT_LAG, AC_MEET, FE, 
HIGH_EM, LOSS and HIGH_PROB_LIT and Pearson correlations otherwise. 
 




TABLE 13: Matched-Pairs Logistic Regression Analysis – Risky Clients Sample 
 
MISSED a = b0 + b1IC_DEF + b2NEW + b3NEG_CF + b4DISTRESS + b5GC + 
b6LEVERAGE + b7LOSS + b8RELATED_PARTY + b9AUDIT_LAG + 
b10AC_IND + b11AC_MEET + b12FE + b13ABN_AUDITFEES + 
b14NONAUDITFEES + b15SIZE + b16AGE + b17BLOCK + b18GROWTH + 
b19PROB_RESTATE + b20HIGH_EM + b21HIGH_PROB_LIT + e 
 
Variable b  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
             IC_DEF  -0.9363   -1.0161   -2.4162 *  -3.1139 * 
NEW  0.5463   0.4557   2.3310 **  3.4043 ** 
NEG_CF  -0.4969   -0.5705   -0.4303   -0.3089  
DISTRESS  0.7196   0.7688   5.5860   -7.5472  
GC  -1.5286 **  -1.5030 *  -1.1256   -0.8613  
LEVERAGE  -0.0201   -0.2501   -1.5492   0.3573  
LOSS  -0.2459   -0.9940   5.1709   12.2125  
RELATED_PARTY  0.0456   0.0402   0.0582   0.1979  
AUDIT_LAG  -0.2435   -0.1152   0.5120   1.1577  
AC_IND  0.2357   -0.3803   -1.9816   -3.9112 * 
AC_MEET  0.4101   0.7923   -1.5641   -3.4320  
FE  0.3967   0.5435   -0.0984   -0.1363  
ABN_AUDITFEES  -0.6380 *  -0.5555   -1.1331   -2.2959  
NONAUDITFEES  0.0363   0.0544   0.1174   0.2237 * 
SIZE  0.3896 ***  0.4820 ***  1.2486 **  2.1818 ** 
AGE  -0.2965   -0.3716   -1.4842 **  -3.7299 ** 
BLOCK  -0.1182   -0.0724   1.9116   2.2862  
GROWTH  0.0936   0.0496   1.0352   0.8973  
PROB_RESTATE  0.1853   0.0893   -2.4425   -9.4683 * 
HIGH_EM     0.1259      0.0325  
HIGH_PROB_LIT        -3.7791 **  -7.0110 ** 
             N  208   202   126   124  
χ2  43.73   46.80   42.23   50.54  
p-value  0.0010   0.0006   0.0026   0.0003  
Adjusted R2  30.33%   33.43%   48.35%   58.80%  
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TABLE 13 (Continued) 
 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at p <  0.10, p <  0.05 and p <  0.01, respectively, based on 
two-tailed tests. 
 
a The dependent variable for this analysis is MISSED, which equals 1if the company restated 
their financial statements and the audit firm did not resign in the period prior to the restatement 
and 0 otherwise. 
  
b All variables are defined in Table 2 or Table 11.  For the regression analysis AGE, 
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